The Representative Equality Principle:  Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent Standard by Ross, Bertrall L., II
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 81 Issue 1 Article 2 
2012 
The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal 
Protection Intent Standard 
Bertrall L. Ross II 
University of California, Berkeley School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent 
Standard, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 175 (2013). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol81/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 175 
ARTICLE 
THE REPRESENTATIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE:  
DISAGGREGATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
INTENT STANDARD 
Bertrall L. Ross II* 
 
Challenges under the Equal Protection Clause require proof of 
intentional discrimination.  Though rarely questioned by legal scholars or 
the courts, that conventional account cannot explain the success of equal 
protection challenges to electoral structures that dilute the vote of racial 
minorities.  In the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions on vote dilution, 
the Court has invalidated local electoral structures under the Equal 
Protection Clause to the extent that they deprive African Americans of the 
opportunity for effective representation in the political process.  The Court 
has reached its decisions despite the absence of any proof of intentional 
discrimination in the adoption of the electoral structures. 
In the vote dilution cases, the Supreme Court is best understood as 
having applied a critical alternative principle underlying the Equal 
Protection Clause:  the representative equality principle.  Using this 
principle, which originated in the reapportionment cases of the 1960s, the 
Court has invalidated structures that undermine two preconditions of 
representative government:  majority rule and effective representation of 
minorities in the political process.  It has done so even in the absence of 
evidence of intentional discrimination. 
The idea that courts should use judicial review to strengthen the political 
processes underlying democratic representation is well known.  That form 
of judicial review is termed “representation-reinforcing judicial review.”  
In this Article, I argue that the vote dilution cases, along with the 
reapportionment cases, constitute a distinctive form of judicial review, one 
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that is a necessary precursor to representation-reinforcing judicial review.  
This form should be understood as “representation-structuring judicial 
review.”  By policing the basic structures of representative democracy, the 
Court protects majority rule and minorities’ effective representation in the 
political process.  In the absence of these critical preconditions, there might 
well be little representation to “reinforce.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, eight black residents of Burke County, Georgia, challenged an 
at-large system of representation in which the five members of the county 
board of commissioners were selected through countywide elections.1  The 
 
 1. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 615–16 (1982).  Rogers v. Lodge is the most 
recent constitutional vote dilution case decided by the Supreme Court.  Since Rogers, the 
Court has addressed vote dilution challenges under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
which prohibits the imposition or application of voting standards that “result[] in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006); see, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 
548 U.S. 399 (2006); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 
874 (1994); Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see also Luke P. McLoughlin, 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne:  The Continuity, Proximity, and 
Trajectory of Vote-Dilution Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39, 41 (2006) (describing how “[t]he 
creation of a broad avenue of relief under the [Voting Rights Act] essentially eliminated the 
claims of ‘unconstitutional’ minority vote dilution [and t]he practice of seeking relief under 
the statute instead of the Constitution quickly became the norm”). 
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county was majority-black, but no African American had ever been elected 
to the county board of commissioners.2  The chances for the election of 
white representatives who would be responsive to the interests of black 
voters were remote, at best. 
The reasons for this unresponsiveness were related to the political and 
social context surrounding the operation of the at-large scheme in Burke 
County, which represented a familiar pattern across many parts of the 
South.  A history of voting discrimination meant blacks constituted only 38 
percent of registered voters.3  For an ordinary minority, this vote share 
would be enough to influence elections and policymaking.  But African 
Americans in Burke County were not an ordinary minority that could either 
individually, or in coalitions with other groups, influence elections.  Whites 
in Burke County rarely voted for black candidates or candidates who would 
be responsive to the interests of the black community.4  Moreover, the 
absence of competition between political parties in the one-party 
Democratic South reduced electoral competition for votes—the primary 
structural incentive for parties to include the African American minority in 
the political process.5  This combination of factors deprived blacks of the 
opportunity to influence the outcome of elections and left them politically 
marginalized.6  Consequently, the Burke County Board of Commissioners 
was generally unresponsive to the needs of the black community—from the 
seemingly mundane issues of road paving in predominantly black 
neighborhoods, to the more consequential failure to remedy black 
complaints about school and grand jury segregation.7  The result was a 
disproportionately poor, undereducated, and underserved black community 
with limited ability to effectively influence political affairs in the county.8 
In a surprise ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the at-large system 
in Burke County violated the Equal Protection Clause.9  In Rogers v. Lodge, 
the Court invalidated the at-large plan despite the absence of any evidence 
 
 2. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623 (stating that black candidates had run for office in the 
Burke County Commission, but none had ever won); CHARLES S. BULLOCK III & RONALD 
KEITH GADDIE, THE TRIUMPH OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH 83–85 (2009) (describing the 
lag in black voter registration through the 1980s); McDonald et al., Georgia, in QUIET 
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH:  THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 67–74 
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (describing the history of voting laws 
in Georgia that were designed to disenfranchise African Americans). 
 3. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 615. 
 4. Id. at 623; McDonald et al., supra note 2, at 84 (describing voting in Georgia as 
ordinarily polarized along racial lines during this period). 
 5. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 624–25 (describing the exclusion of blacks from the 
Democratic Party). See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN 
POLITICS:  SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 
1880–1910, at 238–65 (1974) (offering an explanation for the emergence of the one-party 
South in the years following Reconstruction and continuing through the 1980s). 
 6. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623 (“Voting along racial lines allows those elected to 
ignore black interests without fear of political consequences.”). 
 7. See id. at 625–26. 
 8. See id. at 626 (describing the depressed socioeconomic status of blacks in Burke 
county). 
 9. See id. at 627; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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of intentional discrimination in the county’s adoption of the scheme in 
1911.10  Instead, the Court focused on the consequences of the districting 
scheme in the political and social context in which it operated.11  Since the 
scheme operated to deprive blacks of the opportunity to effectively 
influence the political process, it violated the Equal Protection Clause.12 
Why was Rogers a surprise?  Largely because the holding in the case 
seemed to directly contradict the equal protection standard that the Court 
developed over the six years immediately prior to the decision.  In a famous 
trilogy of cases in the late 1970s—Washington v. Davis,13 Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,14 and 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney15—the Court 
determined that, to successfully challenge a law under the Equal Protection 
Clause, litigants had to show that a state actor intended to discriminate 
against a particular class of individuals.16  Under this model, which 
suggested a search for an individual perpetrator, the Court required either 
direct evidence of discriminatory intent in the form of testimonial 
statements or circumstantial evidence of discrimination from the context 
surrounding the adoption or active reaffirmation of a law.17  Such evidence 
was not even presented in Rogers.  In fact, the Court in Rogers never 
pointed to any particular perpetrator of discrimination. 
In the present, Rogers remains a puzzle because it fits uncomfortably 
with what has since become the dominant account of equal protection.  
Resting on the trilogy of Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney, this 
conventional account depicts equal protection as a standard that only 
invalidates laws motivated by intentional racial discrimination.  Rather than 
trying to reconcile the equal protection standard applied in Rogers with that 
applied in the Davis trilogy, scholars typically ignore Rogers.18  The few 
who do pay any sustained attention to the case either describe it as an 
outlier, implicitly suggesting that the Court erred in its application of the 
 
 10. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 626–27 (adopting the district court’s finding that the 
electoral system was “neutral in origin”). 
 11. See id. at 624–27. 
 12. See id. at 627. 
 13. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 14. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 15. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 16. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; Davis, 426 U.S. at 240. 
 17. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264–68. 
 18. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent:  Do We 
Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991); Barbara J. Flagg, 
Enduring Principles:  On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 935 
(1994); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”:  The 
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 615; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Eva Patterson et al., The Id, The Ego, 
and Equal Protection in the 21st Century:  Building upon Charles Lawrence’s Vision to 
Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175 (2008); 
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:  Round Three, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 494 (2003); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989). 
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intent standard,19 or treat it as an example of the Court giving greater 
scrutiny to interests or rights considered fundamental.20 
In this Article, I argue that the standard employed in Rogers should not 
be ignored.  Far from an insignificant relic, it is best understood as the 
Court’s most recent application of a critical alternative principle underlying 
the Equal Protection Clause:  the representative equality principle.  The 
conventional account suggests that Davis and its progeny established a 
universal intent standard applicable to all discrimination claims challenging 
facially neutral state actions under the Equal Protection Clause.21  This is 
not the case.  Instead, the Court has applied an alternative standard of proof 
that I refer to as an “operative effects” standard to challenges against 
electoral structures that allegedly undermine the structural mandate of 
representative equality.  Under this operative effects standard, the Court 
measures the constitutionality of a voting scheme from the democratic 
effects of its current operation rather than the intent underlying its past 
adoption.  The equal protection right protected by Rogers is therefore not 
simply a right to be free from biased decision making in the adoption of an 
electoral scheme.  It is a structurally driven right to effective representation 
in the political process for politically marginalized minorities. 
The operative effects standard reflected in Rogers should be understood 
as evolving from the reapportionment cases of the early 1960s, when the 
Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to require that every 
individual’s vote be equally weighted through equally apportioned 
legislative districts.22  The familiar standard established in those cases was 
 
 19. See Ian Haney López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 
2012) (manuscript at 76), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1920418#%23 (suggesting that the decision in Rogers was a response to 
congressional criticism of a prior case, Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which 
Congress ultimately overturned statutorily with an amendment to the Voting Rights Act); 
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:  The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 
86 GEO. L.J. 279, 313–15 (1997) (“One can only speculate . . . as to the legacy of 
[Rogers].”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms 
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1997) (acknowledging that 
the Court in Rogers had employed a different standard of proof than the Court had applied in 
Feeney, but never offering a reason for the distinction). 
 20. See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1132 (1998) 
(arguing that the substance of the right being protected explains the Court’s use of a more 
lenient standard in Rogers); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1136–37 (1989) (arguing that the Court applies a different intent 
standard in voting cases because of “the importance of the individual interest at stake”); see 
also infra Part II. 
 21. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-20, at 1509 
(2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that in Davis, the Court “announced that henceforth every lawsuit 
involving constitutional claims of racial discrimination directed at facially race-neutral rules 
would be conducted as a search for a bigoted decision-maker”); Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle:  Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black 
Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145, 150 (“Since its landmark decision in 
Washington v. Davis . . . the Supreme Court has consistently held that in order to establish a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on racial discrimination, a litigant must show 
that the state had engaged in purposeful, or intentional, discrimination.”). 
 22. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 
(1964); see also infra Part II.B. 
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one-person, one-vote, a right that the Court at the time suggested was 
personal and individual.23  However, in the process of construing the Equal 
Protection Clause to require one-person, one-vote, the Court also 
established the structural mandate that would drive the evaluation of 
whether the personal right was being violated—the mandate of fair and 
effective representation in the political process.24  This mandate developed 
over time to require not only that majorities rule, but that majorities also 
account for and consider the interests of minorities in the representative 
process.  I refer to this mandate as the “representative equality” principle.  
This Article makes the case that the representative equality principle is an 
already established, and normatively attractive interpretation of equal 
protection in the voting context—one that deserves full recognition 
alongside the discriminatory intent interpretation of equal protection. 
Recovering the representative equality principle has important 
implications for substantive constitutional law concerning minority voting 
rights.  First, there is the question of the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965,25 which rests in part on the issue of the extent of 
Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.  An account of 
the Equal Protection Clause as merely prohibiting intentional discrimination 
suggests that congressional authority to enact the Voting Rights Act is 
questionable, since the Act invalidates a whole host of state actions that 
would be found constitutional under the intent standard.26  However, if the 
representative equality principle is recognized as a valid interpretation of 
the Equal Protection Clause, Congress has the authority to enforce that 
principle by barring electoral structures that undermine effective 
representation. 
Second, there is the question of whether it is permissible for jurisdictions 
to consider race in drawing electoral district lines when the purpose is to 
secure opportunities for the effective representation of politically 
marginalized groups.  Some scholars have argued that the use of race in this 
context is inconsistent with the colorblindness principle and therefore 
 
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2006). 
 26. Several articles have been written assessing the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act under the assumption that the Equal Protection Clause is exclusively animated by 
the antidiscrimination principle. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act in the Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 125 (2010); John Matthew Guard, “Impotent Figureheads”?  State Sovereignty, 
Federalism, and the Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act after Lopez v. 
Monterey County and City of Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REV. 329 (1999); Pamela S. 
Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives:  Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1998) (arguing for the continued constitutionality of the 
Voting Rights Act under the Boerne standard); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 749–51 (1998) (questioning the 
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act); Jennifer G. Presto, The 1982 Amendments to 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:  Constitutionality after City of Boerne, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 609 (2004); Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 69 (2003). 
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unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.27  Understanding the 
Equal Protection Clause as also encompassing a representative equality 
principle complicates this account, as the issue then pits two constitutional 
principles against each other. 
Because I focus on identifying and situating the representative equality 
principle within the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, this 
Article does not flesh out the arguments for the constitutionality of the 
Voting Rights Act and of race-conscious districting.  Nonetheless, this 
project takes the first step toward using the representative equality principle 
to resolve these controversies by building the necessary doctrinal and 
theoretical foundations. 
Rethinking the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause also 
has important implications for our understanding of the proper judicial role 
in structuring representative democracy.  The Court’s elaboration of the 
mandate of representative equality is one example of an important judicial 
function that was anticipated, but not well theorized, by political process 
theorists.28  I describe that function as “representation-structuring judicial 
review.” 
Political process theory, most prominently developed by John Hart Ely, 
seeks to reconcile judicial review with democracy.29  In particular, process 
theory provides a justification for the unelected and unaccountable 
judiciary’s role in the invalidation of democratically enacted laws.30  
According to process theory, laws enacted through a defective process 
suffer a democratic legitimacy deficit; as a result, the invalidation of such 
laws can in fact reinforce representative government.31  Equal protection 
scholars further argue that the courts, in applying the discriminatory intent 
standard, correct democratic defects resulting from impure government 
decision making—decision making motivated by animus toward a minority.  
In doing so they protect minorities and buttress a government that is 
representative of all interests.32 
The vote dilution cases demonstrate that process theory, as currently 
understood, is incomplete.  In order to ensure a political process that is 
properly representative in that it is inclusive of all interests, process 
theory’s suggested role for judicial review must extend beyond mere 
 
 27. See, e.g., ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE ELUSIVE 
QUEST FOR RACIALLY FAIR ELECTIONS 143-67 (2009); Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative 
Racial Gerrymandering:  Fair Representation for Minorities or a Dangerous Recognition of 
Group Rights?, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 599–604 (1995). But see, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & 
Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1202–04 (1996); 
Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 245, 247–48 (1997); James Thomas Tucker, Affirmative Action and 
[Mis]representation:  Part II—Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision of the Right to Vote, 
43 HOW. L.J. 405, 443–44 (2000). 
 28. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77–88 (1980).  
 29. See  id. at 101–03. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 
(1985) (describing process theory’s approach to resolving the countermajoritarian difficulty). 
 32. See infra Part III. 
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reinforcement of representative government at the back end.  Judicial 
review must also structure the government process so that it is 
representative at the front end.  In this role, the courts are responsible for 
correcting defects in the basic electoral structure underlying representative 
government—defects that can only be ascertained through an assessment of 
the operation of an electoral scheme, and not through the intent of those 
adopting it.33  Ely posits that courts can serve this structural role by 
enforcing other constitutional safeguards, largely outside of the Equal 
Protection Clause:  maintaining constitutional checks on majority tyranny—
through the preservation of separation of powers and federalism—and by 
ensuring that the interests of groups in the majority coalition are tied to 
those of minorities through generally applicable laws.34 
I argue that Ely’s suggested means for structuring representative 
government to account for minorities’ interests are ultimately incomplete.  
Process theory’s proposed constitutional checks on majority power, 
especially the strategy of ensuring that the interests of the majority coalition 
are tied to those of the minority through generally applicable laws, are 
premised on an assumption that members of the minority and the majority 
will be similarly situated and similarly impacted by the law.  However, 
many minorities, especially politically marginalized ones, are vulnerable to 
generally applicable laws that impose disparate harms on them because they 
are differently situated from members of the majority coalition.  While the 
egalitarian goal of process theory clearly does not require that minorities be 
guaranteed equal outcomes from laws, it does require the government to 
account for and consider all interests in the enactment of such laws.  And 
generally applicable laws do not guarantee such accounting for and 
consideration of interests, particularly when the politically disempowered 
minority is differently situated, and therefore differently affected, by those 
laws. 
The Court’s vote dilution doctrine is one means of more fully reconciling 
majority rule with the protection of minority interests.  The Court’s review 
in vote dilution cases is aimed at structural impediments to opportunities for 
effective representation in the political process.  The judicial invalidation of 
electoral structures that prevent minorities from having their interests 
considered and accounted for in the policymaking process is thus an 
additional process-based mechanism for attaining a government that is 
representative of all interests.  Scholars have not yet fully appreciated this 
representation-structuring aspect of vote dilution doctrine. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  In the first Part, I describe the 
inconsistency between the Court’s equal protection intent standard in the 
Davis trilogy and the standard employed in the vote dilution cases.  I show 
that the evidentiary standards in these two lines of cases are distinct, with 
the Court in the Davis trilogy focused on identifying a perpetrator of 
discrimination, while in the vote dilution cases the Court focused on how 
 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See infra Part III. 
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the laws in question operated in practice.  I conclude this Part by arguing 
that previous scholarly attempts to make sense of the inconsistency fail to 
adequately explain the distinction. 
In Part II, I argue that the standard employed in the vote dilution cases, 
which I call the “operative effects standard,” is best understood as being 
derived from the reapportionment cases decided in the 1960s and early 
1970s.  In these two sets of cases, the Court restructured the pluralist 
marketplace to protect both majorities and minorities based on a 
representative equality principle.  It is important to note that my goal in 
reconstructing the origins and development of this principle is not to try to 
accurately channel the justices’ actual thinking or motivations for deciding 
these cases as they did.  Instead, my focus is on the jurisprudence produced 
by the Court.  I therefore seek an interpretation of the decisions that “best 
fits” the broader doctrinal landscape and argue that the representative 
equality principle offers the best explanatory fit.35  
Finally, in Part III, I argue that this interpretation of the vote dilution 
cases rests on a very strong normative foundation.  Although revising the 
baseline rules and structures of electoral representation to accord with the 
representative equality principle involves the Court in a substantive value 
choice regarding the form that our democracy will take, such a choice can 
be justified under a process-theoretic account of the proper judicial role in a 
democracy.  The Court in these cases is engaging in representation-
structuring judicial review in which it is establishing the essential 
preconditions for representative government and ultimately for the 
operation of a process-based, representation-reinforcing judicial review.  If 
the Court did not play this role, it is not at all clear that other institutional 
actors would be able to fill the gap. 
I.  AN UNEXPLAINED EXCEPTION TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
INTENT STANDARD 
In this Part, I examine how the Court in a trilogy of cases beginning with 
Davis reaffirmed an equal protection intent standard that invalidated laws 
only upon proof that a state actor had a discriminatory motive in the 
adoption of a law.  I show how in doing so, the Court specifically rejected 
an alternative framework that would have looked to the discriminatory 
consequences of the operation of the law.  I then argue that two important 
vote dilution cases decided shortly after this trilogy fit awkwardly within 
this intent-based evidentiary framework, and instead more closely accord 
 
 35. This methodological approach draws on the framework that Ronald Dworkin 
employs for how judges should decide hard cases.  He explains:  
Law as integrity asks a judge deciding . . . a case . . . to think of himself as an 
author in the chain of common law.  He knows that other judges have decided 
cases that, although not exactly like his case, deal with related problems; he 
must think of their decisions as part of a long story he must interpret and then 
continue, according to his own judgment of how to make the developing story 
as good as it can be.   
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 238–39 (1986). 
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with the alternative framework that the Court specifically rejected in the 
trilogy.  I conclude with a description of two scholarly attempts to solve this 
puzzle, contending that they are both unsuccessful. 
A.  The Trilogy and the Reaffirmation of the Intent Standard 
The usual scholarly starting point for what has been described as the 
equal protection antidiscrimination principle is the much-scrutinized case of 
Davis.  In that case, the Court held that the evidentiary burden for equal 
protection challengers was to show that a law or action was motivated by 
the discriminatory intent of a particular state actor—or “perpetrator”—of 
discrimination.36 
The importance of Davis lies not only in its requirement that plaintiffs 
demonstrate the discriminatory intent of one or more perpetrators, but also 
in its rejection of an alternative evidentiary framework that the Court had 
developed in its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act37 in the decade preceding the case.38  This 
alternative framework denied the relevance of the perpetrator’s motives to 
the assessment of the constitutionality of a law under the Equal Protection 
Clause in part because of the difficulty of ascertaining the motive of a 
collective body and the futility of invalidating statutes on the basis of 
 
 36. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).  This evidentiary burden did not 
originate in Davis.  Rather, the Court had employed a similar standard in varying form in 
deciding challenges to alleged discriminatory jury selection and racial gerrymandering since 
the early years of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 
(1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942); 
see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57 (1964) (applying a perpetrator intent 
standard to the race-based drawing of district lines); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 
341 (1960) (applying what the Court later interpreted to be a perpetrator intent standard to 
the race-conscious drawing of district lines); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal 
Protection and Jury Selection:  Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511, 
538–64 (describing the history of the Court’s jury selection cases); Haney López, supra note 
19, at 8 (“The Court from its earliest years recognized that judging state conduct for its 
constitutionality often required evaluating government purposes.”); Caleb Nelson, Judicial 
Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1818–50 (2008) (describing the 
relevance of legislative purpose in the Court’s assessment of the constitutionality of laws in 
the period from the late nineteenth century to the 1970s); Joseph Tussman and Jacobus 
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 358 (1949).  The Court, 
however, has historically addressed Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment challenges to laws 
that allegedly deny the vote on account of race under a standard that has tended to focus on 
evidence from the operation of the law. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of 
Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939); Myers v. 
Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1915); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364–65 
(1915). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
 38. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (explaining that the focus in 
other cases during the prior decade decided under the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Fifteenth Amendment “was on the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the motivation 
which led the States to behave as they did”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–
30 (1971) (establishing the alternative evidentiary framework in a Title VII challenge to a 
corporation’s employment promotion practices).  
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discriminatory intent, since such laws could always be reenacted without 
such a motive.39 
More importantly, the alternative evidentiary framework, as developed in 
the statutory context of Title VII, also seemed to accept disparate impact as 
sufficient for a prima facie finding of discrimination.40  This framework 
incorporated a baseline of equality of opportunity as the measure for 
discrimination.  It also focused attention away from whether a perpetrator 
intended to deprive individuals of equal opportunity to whether the law 
itself, combined with other structural sources of inequality, operated in a 
way that deprived individuals of such opportunity.  For example, in the 
central case establishing this alternative evidentiary framework, Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., the Court invalidated, under Title VII, a power company’s 
requirement that employees either have a high school diploma or pass an 
intelligence test to be promoted.41  It did so even though it found that the 
employer had been trying to improve employment opportunities for blacks 
by providing financial support for employees seeking high school 
training.42  The Court determined that the employment test was nonetheless 
prima facie discriminatory because the promotion criteria operated in a 
context in which blacks had historically received inferior education that 
resulted in their disparate exclusion from promotion opportunities.43 
 
 39. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-25 (suggesting that the discriminatory motive of the 
state actor was irrelevant in a case addressing an equal protection challenge to a city’s 
closure of formerly segregated pools after a court order that it operate these pools on a 
desegregated basis); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.367, 383 (1968) (rejecting a motive-
based challenge to a law on the grounds that “[i]nquiries into congressional motives or 
purposes are a hazardous matter”); see also Ely, supra note 28, at 1212–17 (elaborating on 
the concerns associated with the motive inquiry of ascertainability and futility and 
identifying an additional concern of disutility in which the Court invalidates laws that are 
“laudable in operational terms simply because the process which produced them was 
disreputable”). 
 40. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (explaining that, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
“practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, 
cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory 
employment practices”).  The Court had, a year earlier, signaled the importance of 
discriminatory impact to the constitutional inquiry without going so far as to hold that such 
impact could alone be the basis for finding a state decision unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 220, 224 (noting the lack of disparate impact 
resulting from the decision of the city to close pools while also announcing that the 
motivation for the decision was not relevant to the constitutional inquiry). But see, e.g., 
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (“[T]he differentiating factor between 
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to 
segregate.”); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972) (“The acceptance of 
appellants’ constitutional theory would render suspect each difference in treatment among 
the grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the 
treatment might be.”); Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial 
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 544–48 (1977) (describing the pre-Davis 
uncertainty around whether discriminatory purpose or effect was the proper equal protection 
standard). 
 41. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. 
 42. Id. at 432. 
 43. Id. at 430–31. 
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In the trilogy of cases beginning with Davis and continuing through 
Arlington Heights, and Feeney, the Court changed course.  In particular, it 
reaffirmed that the intent of the perpetrator, rather than the consequences of 
the operation of the law, was central to the assessment of whether a state 
action violated the Equal Protection Clause.44  In the most extreme version 
of the perpetrator intent standard articulated in Feeney, a challenger to a 
state action would need to show that the decision maker “selected or 
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not 
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”45  This 
evidentiary requirement of perpetrator intent, the Court conceded, was 
greater than the burden it had established under Title VII.46  But it 
explained that the Constitution requires the challenger to a state action to 
prove something more than the disparate impact of that action.47  This shift 
to the perpetrator intent standard had an obvious and significant effect on 
the outcome of cases. 
For example, when the Court addressed the validity of a qualifying test 
for a position as a police officer in the Washington D.C. Metropolitan 
Police Department in Davis, it upheld the test.  It did so even though the test 
operated to disproportionately exclude blacks from officer positions 
because of the inferior education that blacks received in Washington D.C.48  
The Court upheld the test because the Police Department had shown good 
faith in actively recruiting blacks to integrate the police force.49  According 
to the Court, this evidence contradicted any argument that the police 
department intended to discriminate against blacks in the administration of 
 
 44. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the 
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially 
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate 
impact.”).  Despite this assertion, it is fairly clear that the Court in Davis was reaffirming an 
evidentiary standard that it had veered away from in cases decided during the prior decade. 
See Haney López, supra note 19, at 23 (describing Davis as a rejection of the structural 
implications of Griggs); Siegel, supra note 19, at 1134 (describing the Court’s decision in 
Davis as one in which it announced its “new-found commitment to motive review”).  The 
Court reaffirmed this standard without explaining why discriminatory motive was relevant 
and without adequately reconciling prior case law. See Theodore Eisenberg, 
Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive:  Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 113 (1977) (explaining that the Court in Davis and Arlington Heights 
“[never] articulate[d] why motive is relevant in constitutional adjudication”); Larry G. 
Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions:  A Motivation Theory of the 
Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1104 (1978) 
(criticizing the Court’s confused reconciliation of Palmer v. Thompson with its decision in 
Davis). 
 45. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 46. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239; Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind But Now I See”:  White 
Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 
963 (1993) (describing the Davis intent standard as a “significant departure” from the Griggs 
standard). 
 47. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242; see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273 (“[T]he Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.”). 
 48. See Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976) (explaining that the difference in test passage rates was properly attributed to “the 
long history of educational deprivation, primarily due to segregated schools, for blacks”). 
 49. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 246. 
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the test.50  In other words, even though the test operated discriminatorily, 
the challengers had failed to prove the discriminatory intent of the 
perpetrator. 
For the first time, the Court in the trilogy also clearly identified the 
evidence that would be relevant to proving discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Rather than looking to evidence from the context 
surrounding the operation of the state practice, only evidence from the 
context of the decision to adopt the state practice would be relevant to 
finding a violation of the intent standard.51  While disparate impact 
remained relevant, only in extremely rare circumstances would it be 
dispositive.52  Instead, dispositive evidence would have to be in the form of 
a direct testimonial statement in which one or more state actors during the 
decision-making process expressed animus towards the group.53   
Alternatively, discriminatory intent could be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence such as the sequence of events leading up to the decision, 
deviations from the normal decision-making procedures, or the decision 
maker’s failure to consider factors ordinarily relevant to the decision.54 
When evaluating the constitutionality of a housing ordinance that 
operated in a manner that disproportionately disadvantaged racial minorities 
in Arlington Heights, the Court, applying these evidentiary factors, upheld 
 
 50. See id. at 246 (“We think the District Court correctly held that the affirmative efforts 
of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black officers . . . negated any inference 
that the Department discriminated on the basis of race . . . .”). 
 51. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) 
(“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a 
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be 
available.”). 
 52. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or 
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is 
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id.  Criticism of this motive inquiry is widespread. See, e.g., Gayle Binion, 
“Intent” and Equal Protection:  A Reconsideration, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 397, 397 
(describing the barrier of proving intent as impenetrable); Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law:  A Critical Review of Supreme Court 
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1056 (1978) (“Dual requirements [of fault and causation] 
place on the victim the nearly impossible burden of isolating the particular conditions of 
discrimination produced by and mechanically linked to the behavior of an identified 
blameworthy perpetrator, regardless of whether other conditions of discrimination, caused by 
other perpetrators, would have to be remedied for the outcome of the case to make any 
difference at all.”); Lawrence, supra note 18, at 319 (suggesting that the intent standard 
“places a very heavy, and often impossible, burden of persuasion on the wrong side of the 
dispute”); see also Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 18, at 1160 (explaining that a primary 
source of dissatisfaction with the equal protection standard is the difficulty of proving 
discriminatory purpose).  It is especially difficult under this standard to redress 
discrimination motivated by unconscious bias. See, e.g., Samuel Bagenstos, The Structural 
Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“Unconscious 
bias . . . generates inequalities that our current antidiscrimination law is not well equipped to 
solve.”); Lawrence, supra note 18, at 322 (explaining that much of racially discriminatory 
activity “is influenced by unconscious racial motivation” and that a standard “requiring proof 
of conscious or intentional motivation . . . ignores much of what we understand about how 
the human mind works”). 
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the law because “there [was] little about the sequence of events leading up 
to the decision that would spark suspicion.”55  In addition, statements from 
the administrative record indicated to the Court that there were other non-
racial reasons for adopting the ordinance.56  Finally, the Court concluded 
that testimony of a board member responsible for the decision to adopt the 
ordinance failed to provide any support for an inference of discriminatory 
purpose.57  As in Davis, the lack of perpetrator intent once again trumped 
any concern about the discriminatory operation of the statute in the Court’s 
decision to uphold the law. 
Finally, in Feeney, the Court rejected as irrelevant the fact that a 
Massachusetts veterans’ job preference operated in a context in which 
women had historically been disproportionately excluded from military 
service.58  As a result of this history, the preference in the words of the 
author of the majority opinion, Justice Stewart, “operate[d] overwhelmingly 
to the advantage of males.”59  Rather than rely on this powerful evidence of 
the discriminatory operation of the preference scheme linked to ongoing 
discriminatory practices, the Court looked instead exclusively to the context 
surrounding the decision to adopt and reaffirm the veterans’ job preference 
to determine its constitutionality.60  The Court identified as the dispositive 
question, “whether the [challenger to the preference] ha[d] shown that a 
gender-based discriminatory purpose has, at least in some measure, shaped 
the Massachusetts veterans’ preference legislation.”61  From this starting 
point, the majority determined that the legislative decision to establish the 
veterans’ preference in the period after the Civil War and its subsequent 
decision to modify and reaffirm the preference during World War I and 
World War II was motivated by a desire to protect veterans and not a desire 
to discriminate against female job applicants.62  To support this conclusion, 
 
 55. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269. 
 56. Id. at 270. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 489 (D. Mass. 1976) (describing 
the historical limitations on the service of women in the military). 
 59. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979). 
 60. In doing so, the Court gave a nod to the Arlington Heights factors in a footnote, 
explaining that “[p]roof of discriminatory intent must necessarily usually rely on objective 
factors, several of which were outlined in [Arlington Heights].” Id. at 279 n.24.  The Court 
goes on to explain that the focus of the inquiry is to ascertain “[w]hat a legislature or any 
official entity is ‘up to.’” Id.  The majority continued by explaining that 
when the adverse consequences of a law upon an identifiable group are as 
inevitable as the gender-based consequences of [the preference scheme], a strong 
inference that the adverse effects were desired can reasonably be drawn.  But in 
this inquiry—made as it is under the Constitution—an inference is a working tool, 
not a synonym for proof.  When, as here, the impact is essentially an unavoidable 
consequence of a legislative policy that has in itself always been deemed to be 
legitimate, and when, as here, the statutory history and all of the available evidence 
affirmatively demonstrate the opposite, the inference simply fails to ripen into 
proof. 
Id. at 279 n.25. 
 61. Id. at 276. 
 62. Id. at 278–80.  Specifically, the Court held: 
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the majority pointed to the good faith attempts by the Massachusetts 
legislatures that modified the law “to include as many military women as 
possible within the scope of the preference.”63  Lacking evidence of 
discriminatory motivation, the Court upheld the veterans preference.  In the 
process, it disregarded both the gender disparities resulting from the 
preference and  the fact that it operated in a context in which women still 
suffered from discrimination in their opportunities to serve in the military, 
and upheld the preference.64 
One of the Court’s principal justifications for its movement away from an 
evidentiary standard that invalidated laws on the basis of their operation 
was that the standard lacked an appropriate constitutional baseline to 
measure when a law operated to discriminate against members of a 
particular group.65  Any standard that focuses on disproportionate 
disadvantage has to answer the question:  disproportionate disadvantage as 
compared to what?  A logical baseline for measuring a violation of equal 
protection is equality of outcome, a baseline that the Court seemingly 
accepted in developing the alternative framework in the Title VII context.66  
According to this baseline, any state action that impacts one group 
differently from another group would be presumptively discriminatory 
unless justified.  The problem with a pure discriminatory impact standard is 
that it would potentially subject to strict scrutiny every state action unless 
that action achieved the nearly impossible task of equal outcomes for all 
groups.67  To protect against this danger, the alternative evidentiary 
framework required that the challenger of an employment practice produce 
evidence of discrimination from the context in which the practice operated 
to show that the difference in treatment was not due to random chance or 
reasons unrelated to surrounding structural discrimination.68 
The Court rejected an equality of outcome baseline in the trilogy.  It did 
so, however, without acknowledging that the baseline did not simply 
require equality of outcomes, but operated in conjunction with an 
 
The District Court’s conclusion that the absolute veterans’ preference was not 
originally enacted or subsequently reaffirmed for the purpose of giving an 
advantage to males as such necessarily compels the conclusion that the State 
intended nothing more than to prefer ‘veterans.’  Given this finding, simple logic 
suggests that an intent to exclude women from significant public jobs was not at 
work in this law. 
Id. at 277. 
 63. Id. at 269. 
 64. Id. at 279–81. 
 65. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (expressing concern about the far 
reach of a standard that invalidated a statute designed to serve neutral ends that in practice 
benefited or burdened one race more than another). 
 66. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (describing as the 
objective of Title VII, the “achieve[ment of] equality of employment opportunities and [the] 
remov[al of] barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white 
employees over other employees”). 
 67. See Ely, supra note 28, at 1258. 
 68. For example, an employer could defend an employment practice that had a disparate 
impact on a minority group by showing a business necessity for the practice. See Griggs, 
401 U.S. at 429–30. 
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assessment of the context surrounding the operation of a practice.  Instead, 
the Court simply announced that a discriminatory impact standard would 
“render suspect each difference in treatment among the grant classes, 
however lacking in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the 
treatment might be.”69  It would therefore subject to potential invalidation 
“a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing 
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black 
than to the more affluent white.”70  This impact standard was untenable, 
according to the Court, because it would overly constrain the 
constitutionally prescribed legislative prerogative to enact laws and it would 
give the court too much power to invalidate these laws.71 
In rejecting the disparate impact standard, the Court did not render 
irrelevant evidence of disproportionate disadvantage.  Such evidence could 
serve as a starting point for an assessment of whether an actor was 
motivated by discrimination in its enactment of a law.72  In fact, the Court 
suggested that a massive disparate impact alone could potentially constitute 
prima facie evidence of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.73  
For example, voting criteria that prevent all but a few members of a 
minority group from participating in an election or a licensing arrangement 
that results in a denial for nearly every member of a minority group would 
be presumptively unconstitutional.74  However, in practice it seemed the 
state action would only be subject to heightened scrutiny if it could be 
shown that there was no other explanation for it apart from discrimination.  
Thus, even though only 1.8 percent of Massachusetts’s veterans were 
women, the fact that the veterans preference could be explained as a law 
intended to benefit veterans, and not simply to disadvantage women, 
overcame the huge disproportionate impact to serve as a basis for upholding 
the law.75 
According to most equal protection scholars, the Davis trilogy 
established a universal perpetrator intent standard that has been applied with 
some slight variations to all challenges to alleged discriminatory state 
actions.  This is reflected in the antidiscrimination standard’s focus on the 
subjective motivations of a particular state actor and the rejection of 
particular substantive outcomes, such as equality, as a constitutional 
 
 69. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241 (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972)). 
 70. Id. at 248. 
 71. See Flagg, supra note 18, at 952 (“[A]pplying strict scrutiny in all disparate impact 
cases would engage the courts too extensively in overseeing social policy.”). 
 72. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not 
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.”). 
 73. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) 
(“Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the 
effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.”). 
 74. See id. (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356 (1886)). 
 75. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 270 (1979). 
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baseline for evaluating whether an action violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.76 
This conventional account of a uniform perpetrator intent standard is, 
however, oversimplified.  The Court has not reviewed all state actions 
under the Equal Protection Clause in a universal manner.  In the next 
section, I argue that in two important voting cases decided shortly after the 
trilogy, City of Mobile v. Bolden77 and Rogers, a majority of the Court 
deviated from the two central features of the antidiscrimination principle 
articulated in the trilogy.  These cases involved challenges to districting 
schemes that allegedly deprived minority groups of the opportunity to 
influence the political process.  In Bolden and Rogers, the Court focused on 
evidence from the context surrounding the operation of the law, rather than 
on the discriminatory intent of those adopting the law.  I argue that, in 
doing so, the Court employed an implicit substantive baseline for measuring 
the scheme’s constitutionality.  In the next Part, I argue that the metric the 
Court used to decide the vote dilution cases is best understood as 
representative equality. 
B.  The Vote Dilution Cases:  An Exception to the Intent Standard 
Almost immediately after deciding Feeney, the Court began to deviate 
from the intent standard in two cases involving claims of vote dilution, 
Bolden and Rogers.  In these cases, black residents in two southern counties 
alleged that an at-large scheme of electing county representatives deprived 
them of the opportunity to influence the political process.  Since the Davis 
trilogy of cases was in the process of being decided as the two vote dilution 
cases moved through the judicial pipeline, from the lower courts’ 
perspective the applicable equal protection standard was unclear. 
Bolden involved a claim by black residents of Mobile County, Alabama, 
that the at-large electoral system operating in the county violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.78  The district court conceded that at the time the at-large 
system was adopted in 1911, blacks had been effectively disenfranchised.  
The at-large system therefore could not have been adopted with the intent of 
diluting the black vote.79  Nonetheless, the court held that the at-large 
 
 76. See, e.g., Haney López, supra note 19, at 23 (explaining that the Court in Davis 
“renounce[d] a constitutional commitment to ensuring equitable outcomes”); Siegel, supra 
note 19, at 1134–35 (describing the diminishing importance of disparate impact to the 
Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis). 
 77. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 78. The at-large electoral system was also challenged under Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60–61. 
 79. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 397 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d, 571 
F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev’d and remanded, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).  This effective 
disenfranchisement resulted from exclusionary voting rules enacted by the Alabama 
constitutional convention ten years earlier. Id. at 401.  The county of Mobile also provided 
nonracial justifications for the at-large scheme. Brief for Appellant at 28, Bolden, 446 U.S. 
55 (No. 77-1844), 1978 WL 207139, at *28 (describing the good government ends of the at-
large system as “provid[ing] citywide perspective and responsibility for actions equally to 
each voter”). 
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system unconstitutionally discriminated against the black residents of 
Mobile County.80 
Two theories of intent supported the district court’s finding of 
discrimination.  The first was that, while the county adopted the system in a 
“race-proof situation,” the state actors that enacted the at-large scheme 
could have foreseen its discriminatory impact.81  They should have 
reasonably expected that blacks would one day be enfranchised and that an 
at-large district, which would comprise a larger number of voters than 
single member districts, would limit their opportunity to elect candidates of 
their choice in a context of societal racism.82  The second theory was that, 
even assuming the legislature that adopted the at-large system was not 
discriminatorily motivated, the system currently was being retained in a 
context that denied blacks the opportunity to be effectively represented in 
the political process.83 
By the time Bolden reached the Supreme Court, the Court in Feeney had 
already rejected the district court’s first theory of discriminatory intent, that 
such intent could be found when government actors reasonably could have 
foreseen the discriminatory consequences of their actions.84  The Court in 
Davis and Feeney also seemed to implicitly reject the district court’s second 
theory, which indicated that discriminatory intent could be inferred from the 
conscious, but passive, retention of a system with discriminatory effects.  
Under a standard prohibiting the discriminatory retention of a policy with 
obvious discriminatory effects, it would have been difficult to sustain the 
decision to retain the promotion test employed in Davis.  This test, like the 
at-large scheme in Mobile County, had a discriminatory impact on black 
candidates and operated in a context of great societal discrimination.85  It 
would have also been difficult to sustain the veterans’ benefit in Feeney, 
which dramatically and disproportionately benefitted men and operated in a 
context in which women were still excluded from certain aspects of military 
service.86 
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the at-large system in Bolden, but 
the justices were divided.  A plurality of four justices explained that a 
showing that less than a proportionate number of blacks had been elected to 
the county commission would not be sufficient for a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.87  Instead, it would be necessary to show that the at-large 
system was “conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further 
 
 80. See Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 403. 
 81. Id. at 397. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. at 398 (“There is a ‘current’ condition of dilution of the black vote resulting 
from intentional state legislative inaction which is as effective as the intentional state 
action.”). 
 84. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . 
implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”). 
 85. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
 87. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980). 
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racial . . . discrimination.”88  Interestingly, in articulating this standard, the 
plurality did not cite to any of the cases in the trilogy.  Instead, the opinion 
referenced earlier vote dilution cases that, through their focus on evidence 
from the operation of the state electoral scheme, seemed to contradict the 
perpetrator intent standard established in the trilogy.89 
Although some scholars who have studied the discriminatory intent 
standard suggest that the plurality opinion in Bolden fits neatly within the 
framework adopted by the Court in the trilogy,90 it is not so clear that it 
does.  While the plurality found the evidence from the operation of the 
electoral structure insufficient to show discrimination in the case,91 it did 
not suggest that such evidence was irrelevant to the constitutional claim.  In 
fact, the plurality did not foreclose the possibility that such evidence could 
be dispositive in the constitutional invalidation of an electoral scheme.  The 
standard that the plurality employed suggested that a law could be 
invalidated if it simply was “conceived or operated as [a] purposeful 
devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination.”92 
At the same time, the plurality did not critique the challengers’ failure to 
offer any evidence, circumstantial or direct, that the at-large system was 
adopted with an intent to discriminate against black voters.  The plurality 
could have simply rejected the claim for failing to provide such evidence, as 
required under the standard established in the trilogy.  Instead, the justices 
carefully examined evidence from the operation of the at-large scheme and 
explained why each piece of evidence, considered in isolation, was not a 
sufficient basis for invalidating the scheme. 
Perhaps most importantly—even assuming that despite the standard 
articulated, the plurality in Bolden was simply following the evidentiary 
framework established in the trilogy as scholars have suggested—the key 
point is that the Bolden plurality could not secure a fifth vote for its 
reasoning.  Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but suggested an 
alternative, somewhat ambiguous, standard for evaluating claims of vote 
dilution that would focus on whether the practice was “manifestly not the 
product of . . . a traditional political decision.”93  Justice Blackmun also 
concurred for the simple reason that he felt the district court remedy went 
too far in invalidating the Mobile city commission system; he otherwise 
 
 88. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)). 
 89. See id. (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)). See generally Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).  These cases are 
discussed in greater detail in Part II.C. 
 90. See, e.g., Haney López, supra note 19, at 42–44. 
 91. The Court determined that the at-large system was constitutional from the fact that 
blacks could register, vote, and participate as candidates in the political process and from the 
insufficiency of other evidence presented from the context of the operation of the at-large 
system. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 73–74. 
 92. Id. at 66 (alteration in original) (quoting Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149).  
 93. See id. at 90–91 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins’ Kin:  
Justice Stevens and Voting Rights, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 521, 528–29 (1996) (describing the 
origin of Justice Stevens’s unique standard in his earlier appellate jurisprudence premised on 
the view of the black community as just another ordinary interest group). 
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found the reasoning in the dissent persuasive.94  For these justices—and in 
particular for Justice Blackmun, who joined the majorities in each of the 
trilogy cases—there seemed to be something different about vote dilution. 
In fact, the dissenting justices in Bolden interpreted the plurality opinion 
as employing a distinctive standard that looked to the context of the 
operation of the at-large system—not to evidence of discriminatory intent at 
the adoption of the scheme.  They therefore agreed with the majority’s 
formulation of the equal protection standard insofar as it looked to whether 
the scheme was conceived or operated as a purposefully discriminatory 
device, but ultimately disagreed with the plurality’s application of the 
standard.95  For the dissenters, the plurality mistakenly relied upon certain 
contextual factors in isolation, such as the fact that blacks were still able to 
vote, register, and run for office.  The plurality opinion seemed to indicate 
that at-large systems with these characteristics would be insulated from 
attack under the Equal Protection Clause.  The dissenters found this 
approach to be inconsistent with the “totality of the circumstances” 
approach that had been articulated in prior vote dilution cases, which 
focused on the operational context of the scheme in the evaluation of 
discrimination.96  When properly examining the totality of evidentiary 
factors surrounding the operation of the at-large system, the dissent argued 
that the at-large system clearly violated the Equal Protection Clause.97 
After Bolden, the contours of the equal protection standard applicable to 
vote dilution claims were, at the very least, in flux.  Even the “intent” 
standard employed by the plurality in Bolden seemed to require something 
different from that which had been required to prove a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause in the Davis trilogy. 
In Rogers, a vote dilution case decided only two years after Bolden, a 
majority of the Court again focused on the operation of the electoral system, 
not the intent of those who adopted it.98  Other than the fact that the 
challenge was brought against a county commission system in Burke 
County, Georgia, rather than Mobile County, Alabama, there was little to 
differentiate the context surrounding the adoption of the at-large system 
challenged in Rogers.  Both systems were adopted in 1911 at a time when, 
because of prior voting restrictions, blacks were disenfranchised.99  Neither 
of the at-large structures had undergone significant changes since their 
 
 94. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 80 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
 95. See id. at 94 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court did not question the vitality 
of a standard established in White v. Regester that looked to the context of the operation of 
the statute); see also infra Part II.C. 
 96. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 97–99. 
 98. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
 99. At the time that both at-large schemes were erected, all blacks had been 
disenfranchised in both counties. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 386 (S.D. 
Ala. 1976), aff’d, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).  In Georgia, the 
Disenfranchisement Act of 1908 excluded most blacks from voting. See McDonald et al., 
supra note 2, at 69. 
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adoption.100  There was no testimonial evidence that the legislators had 
adopted the structure for the purpose of discriminating against minority 
voters, nor was there other evidence relevant to the context of adoption 
from which discrimination could be inferred.101  And finally, both systems 
could have been justified on the basis of the “good government” principle 
that it is better to have a representative body comprised of individuals 
responsible to the entire geographic polity rather than subsections of the 
polity.102 
Looking to the context surrounding the operation of the at-large scheme 
challenged in Rogers, there were also significant similarities.103  Blacks in 
both counties could register and vote without any formal barriers.104  
However, even though blacks comprised a significant proportion of the 
population in both counties, they constituted a smaller minority of the 
registered voting population due to past discrimination against black 
participation in the political process.105  Their minority status, combined 
 
 100. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 615 (explaining that the county had maintained an at-large 
voting structure since the creation of the Burke County Board of Commissioners in 1911); 
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1067–68 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (describing some of 
the minor modifications to the commission form of government and its at-large structure 
after 1911). 
 101. Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 397 (acknowledging that the 1911 legislation was acting in a 
race-proof situation because of the disenfranchisement of blacks ten years earlier); see also 
Rogers, 458 U.S. at 619–22 (failing to identify any testimonial or circumstantial evidence 
from the adoption of the scheme that would prove the scheme’s unconstitutionality under the 
perpetrator intent standard). 
 102. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court described the good government principles that 
justified multi-member districts. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.15 (1966).  
There was also a suggestion in one of the Supreme Court briefs for Bolden that the lower 
courts explicitly relied on a particular good government justification to uphold the law. See 
Brief for the Appellant at 27, Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (No. 77-1844), 1978 WL 223226, at *27 
(“Both [c]ourts below found that the City’s existing form of government, together with its at-
large electoral system necessarily attendant thereto, are facially neutral and were adopted for 
racially neutral, good-government purposes at a time when invidious racial motivations 
could have played no part . . . .”). 
 103. In fact, if anything, the context surrounding the operation of the at-large system 
challenged in Rogers provided weaker evidence of discrimination than the context 
surrounding the operation of the at-large system in Bolden.  For example, in Bolden, the 
district court found direct evidence of intent behind the maintenance of the at-large plan that 
the Supreme Court did not find in Rogers. Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 397 (“The evidence is 
clear that whenever a redistricting bill of any type is proposed by a county delegation 
member, a major concern has centered around how many, if any, blacks would be elected.”).  
There was also more evidence that voting was polarized along racial lines in Mobile County 
than there was for Burke County. See id. at 386–94. 
 104. Id. at 387; see also Rogers, 458 U.S. at 624 (noting that black voter registration had 
increased since the Voting Rights Act, and suggesting that those who were registered voted 
without hindrance). 
 105. In Burke County, blacks comprised 53.6 percent of the county, but only 38 percent 
of the registered voting population. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 614–15.  In Mobile County, blacks 
comprised 35.4 percent of the population, but only about 28 percent of the registered voters 
in the county. See Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 386.  The district court in Bolden did not directly 
mention the percentage of the voting age population of each race actually registered to vote.  
I therefore calculated this number on the basis of the information given in the opinion, which 
included total population, percent resident black, percent white registered to vote, and 
percent black registered to vote.  I used the following equations to reach the percentage of 
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with racially polarized bloc voting by whites, precluded them from ever 
electing a black representative.106  As a consequence, the county 
commissions in the two counties were generally unresponsive to the needs 
and interests of the black community.107  This unresponsiveness correlated 
with a generally depressed socioeconomic status of blacks in the two 
counties.108 
Despite the overwhelming similarities between the context of adoption 
and operation of the two at-large structures in Bolden and Rogers, the Court 
came to a different decision in Rogers.109  Justice Blackmun, who was 
presumably unconcerned by the remedy that the lower court imposed in 
Rogers, joined the three dissenters from Bolden, along with the newly 
appointed Justice O’Connor, and Justice Burger, a member of the Bolden 
plurality, in the decision to form a majority that invalidated the at-large 
scheme.  The majority explained that the evidence surrounding the 
operation of the at-large scheme was sufficient to support the district court’s 
finding that the “system . . . is being maintained for discriminatory 
purposes.”110  Nowhere in the opinion did the Court explain who the 
perpetrator of discrimination was; nor did it identify who maintained the at-
large system for discriminatory purposes.  Both Justices Powell and 
Stevens, writing separate dissents, focused on this inconsistency between 
the intent standard employed by the majority in Rogers, which failed to 
identify such a perpetrator, and that employed in the trilogy, which did and 
seemed to require that future courts do so as well.111 
Assessed against the central features of the antidiscrimination principle, 
the vote dilution cases, and particularly Rogers, fit rather awkwardly.  First, 
under the equal protection standard applied in Rogers, the lack of an active 
perpetrator of discrimination was ultimately irrelevant to the Court’s 
 
registered voters that were black:  Total population * percentage of white residents * 
percentage of white registered voters = number of white registered voters; Total population * 
percentage of black residents * percentage of black registered voters = number of black 
registered voters; Percentage of black registered voters in county = number of black 
registered voters/(number of white registered voters + number of black registered voters). 
 106. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623–24; Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 387–89. 
 107. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625; Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 400. 
 108. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 626; Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 389–93. 
 109. In the absence of an aggressive judicial remedy imposed by the district court, Justice 
Blackmun joined the Bolden dissenters in the invalidation of the electoral structure.  Quite 
unexpectedly, Chief Justice Burger switched from the plurality upholding the at-large 
structure in Bolden to the majority invalidating the at-large structure in Rogers despite the 
similarities in the context of the operation of the two systems. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 
446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980); see also Rogers, 458 U.S. at 614. 
 110. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623. 
 111. See id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is incongruous that subjective intent is 
identified as the constitutional standard and yet the persons who allegedly harbored an 
improper intent are never identified or mentioned.”); id. at 628–29 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(noting the plurality’s seeming approval of a perpetrator intent standard in Bolden).  The 
Court inexplicably failed to provide the state with an opportunity to defend the 
constitutionality of the at-large scheme by showing that it was designed to achieve a 
compelling interest and that it was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.  It never 
evaluated whether the good government interests for the law were compelling or whether the 
at-large scheme was necessary to satisfy this interest. 
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assessment of the constitutional validity of the at-large scheme.112  Instead, 
what mattered was how the scheme operated in light of the context 
surrounding it.113  Second, the standard’s focus on the operation of the at-
large scheme necessitated some baseline for measuring its constitutionality.  
For the Court to find that an electoral scheme operates unconstitutionally, it 
must rely on some comparator of a properly operating electoral scheme—
one that accords with a particular constitutional principle.  The Court never 
clearly disclosed what this baseline was in Bolden or Rogers.  But it seems 
clear that it was not reviving the substantive equality baseline that it 
specifically rejected in the Davis trilogy since the Court never mentioned a 
lack of proportionate representation for blacks as a relevant consideration. 
In Part II, I argue that a principle of representative equality, premised in 
part on the opportunity for effective representation of politically 
marginalized minority groups, is the best candidate for the substantive 
baseline that guided the judicial determination of the constitutionality of the 
at-large schemes in the vote dilution cases.  But before I probe the contours 
of the representative equality principle, in the next section I examine 
scholarly attempts to reconcile the standard employed in the vote dilution 
cases with the standard employed in the Davis trilogy. 
C.  Previous Attempts to Explain the Exception 
Most scholars of the equal protection discriminatory intent standard 
assume that it applies universally, and that it invalidates laws adopted with 
a discriminatory motivation.114  These scholars therefore identify the 
ambiguous equal protection standard employed in Bolden and the standard 
applied in the trilogy as one and the same.115  Rogers, on the other hand, is 
even more clearly at odds with the traditional intent standard, and so it is 
often relegated to an aside, a footnote, or is altogether ignored.  In these 
asides and footnotes, scholars concede that there is something unusual 
about the intent standard relied on in Rogers to invalidate the at-large 
scheme, but they offer little in the way of explanation for the standard or for 
how it can be reconciled with the Davis trilogy.116  Instead, they mostly 
treat Rogers as an outlier.117 
 
 112. Id. at 627 (majority opinion) (invalidating the voting scheme merely because it was 
passively “be[ing] maintained for the purpose of denying blacks equal access to the political 
processes in the county”). 
 113. Id. at 624–627 (finding intentional maintenance of the scheme on the basis of 
evidence from the discriminatory operation of the scheme). 
 114. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 115. See, e.g., Haney López, supra note 19, at 35–42; Lani Guinier, The Triumph of 
Tokenism:  The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1077, 1095 n.81 (1989) (describing Bolden as a “decision cabining dilution claims to 
direct proof of intentional discrimination”). 
 116. For examples of scholars engaging in a cursory discussion of Rogers, see supra 
notes 18–19. 
 117. See supra notes 18–19.  This treatment of Rogers as an outlier fails to account for 
the cases that preceded Bolden and Rogers, which established and employed a standard that 
looked to the operation of the electoral scheme. See infra Part II.A. 
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This outlier status is bolstered by a standard descriptive account for why 
the Court reversed course in Rogers.  For some scholars, the majority of the 
Court in Rogers was simply reacting to institutional pressures from 
Congress.118  Almost immediately after the decision in Bolden, Congress 
initiated the process of amending a section of the Voting Rights Act to 
overturn the plurality opinion in Bolden by providing a statutory means of 
redress for vote dilution schemes that had discriminatory operative 
effects.119  According to this account, Rogers therefore represented a 
temporary pullback from Bolden, and thus its equal protection standard 
should not be taken seriously as a reflection of current doctrine. 
Descriptive accounts of the Court’s actual purposes are hazardous 
because it is difficult to get inside the heads of the justices to understand 
what is really motivating their choices.  But there is some evidence to 
suggest that the Rogers Court was not simply responding to institutional 
pressures.  First, seven of the nine Justices voted consistently across both 
Bolden and Rogers.120  Four of the Justices in the majority in Rogers had 
already acquiesced to the standard that focused on operative effects in their 
opinions in Bolden,121 and two of the four Justices in the plurality in Bolden 
dissented in Rogers,122 as did Justice Stevens who had concurred with the 
plurality in Bolden but disagreed with the evidentiary standard employed.  
For Justice Stevens, the concern that Rogers seemed to be inconsistent with 
the plurality decision in Bolden trumped any perceived institutional 
pressure to overturn Bolden.  As for the other two justices that joined the 
majority in Rogers, Justice O’Connor was a new member of the Court 
whose subsequent jurisprudence was not entirely out of line with the 
heavily contextualized approach of the majority opinion in Rogers.123  That 
leaves Chief Justice Burger, for whom institutional pressure may have been 
a factor, as he joined the plurality in Bolden, but then reversed course and 
joined the majority in Rogers.  But even for Chief Justice Burger, there is 
evidence to suggest that he agreed with a standard that looked to operative 
effects in the vote dilution context and simply viewed Bolden as 
consistently applying such a standard.  Evidence to support this conclusion 
is the fact that he joined the majority in a key case decided prior to Davis 
 
 118. See e.g., Haney López, supra note 19 at 76. 
119. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1982 provides:  
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which 
results in the denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States 
to vote on account of race or color . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).   
 120. Justices Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Brennan, White, and Marshall.   
 121. Justices Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun.   
 122. Justices Justices Powell and Rehnquist. 
 123. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (authoring the opinion upholding 
affirmative action in education on the basis of a diversity rationale that looked to several 
current contextual factors of the benefits of diversity); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469 (1989) (authoring the opinion invalidating affirmative action in contracting in 
part on the basis of contextual factors surrounding the racial makeup of the legislature and 
the population of the city). 
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that overturned a voting scheme on the basis of such an operative effects 
test.124 
Second, it is not even clear why members of the Court would have felt 
any institutional pressure in Rogers.  Separate constitutional and statutory 
standards had coexisted in the public employment context after Davis, in 
which the Court determined that the equal protection standard differed from 
the Title VII standard.125  This coexistence was facilitated at the time by a 
broad understanding of congressional enforcement power under both the 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,126 which 
gave Congress room to redress discriminatory conduct through statutes that 
would potentially be found valid under the Constitution.127  Given this 
space for broader congressional enforcement, it is not clear why the Court 
would have felt pressure to change its constitutional standard to respond to 
congressional disagreement since neither the standard nor the decision 
threatened legislative prerogative. 
Finally, the account of Rogers as a decision animated by institutional 
pressures becomes much less persuasive when accounting for its connection 
to doctrine preceding Davis.  Rogers was not the one-off decision of a 
nervous Court.  Instead, it is a decision that, through its employment of the 
operative effects standard, was very consistent with a line of constitutional 
vote dilution cases that the Court had previously decided.  In the next Part, I 
focus on connecting Rogers to this line of cases. 
In contrast to those who explain away Rogers, two other scholars have 
provided more comprehensive theories to try to account for the unique 
standard employed in that case.  These scholars’ theories are good starting 
points for making sense of the standard employed in the vote dilution cases, 
but they are ultimately incomplete. 
Daniel Ortiz was the first to offer an explanation for the different equal 
protection standards.128  He argued that the intent standard, insofar as it is 
said to invalidate laws only on the basis of the motivation of the state actor, 
is a myth.129  Instead, the intent standard functions as a mechanism that 
 
 124. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).  White v. Regester is discussed in detail 
below. See infra Part III.C. 
 125. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.   
 127. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649–50 (1966) (broadly defining 
congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
upholding a provision of the Voting Rights Act); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 253–61 (1964) (broadly defining congressional Commerce Clause 
authority in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act as applied to public accommodations); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301–05 (1964) (broadly defining congressional 
Commerce Clause authority in upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act as applied to 
restaurants).  The Supreme Court would not start to narrow these two bases of congressional 
authority until the mid-1990s. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518–20 
(1997) (narrowing congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–68 (1995) (narrowing 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause). 
 128. See Ortiz, supra note 20. 
 129. Id. at 1106 (“Despite the doctrine’s name, ‘intent’ often has little to do with purpose 
or motivation.”). 
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allocates the burden of proof “differently in different contexts in order to 
‘balance’ individual and societal interests consistently with the ideology of 
traditional liberalism.”130  This ideology directs that decision making 
involving the allocation of market goods like housing and employment 
should be left to the market.131  To the extent that the state is involved in 
the allocation of these goods, the judiciary should be more deferential to 
legislative decisions in allocating them.132  Where the allocation decision 
involves nonmarket goods like voting, jury selection, and education, liberal 
ideology does not establish a barrier to judicial intervention in decisions 
that affect the distribution of these goods.133 
With respect to the nonmarket good of voting, Ortiz argued that the 
nature of this good has resulted in greater judicial lenience in the 
application of the intent standard and, specifically, the evidence needed to 
prove discriminatory intent.134  Discussing Bolden and Rogers, he 
explained that in these cases, the Court “does not demand any showing of 
actual discriminatory motivation in the decision to adopt or retain the at-
large system.”135  Instead, “intent [is] largely coextensive with adverse 
impact.”136 
Nine years after Ortiz’s seminal piece, Sheila Foster offered an 
alternative account of the disaggregated intent standard.137  According to 
Foster, the level of judicial restraint employed and the intent standard 
applied depend on three factors:  “(1) the actor making the decision . . . , (2) 
the type of decision made . . . , and (3) the substantive right affected by the 
decision.”138  For Foster, the key variable that differentiates the vote 
dilution cases from other equal protection cases is the nature of the 
substantive right affected by the decision.139  She argued that in cases 
involving fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, the Court exercises 
the least judicial restraint and subjects laws to invalidation that are shown to 
discriminate through objective, circumstantial evidence of intent or 
evidence of disparate impact.140 
Ortiz’s initial contribution and Foster’s subsequent reformulation are 
extremely important in their recognition that the intent doctrine applies 
differently in different contexts.  Insofar as one can describe it as such, the 
intent doctrine that the Court applied in the vote dilution cases of Bolden 
and Rogers is clearly different from that which it applied in the trilogy, 
which involved issues of housing and employment.  However, both Ortiz 
 
 130. Id. at 1107. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1127–31. 
 135. Id. at 1128. 
 136. Id. at 1129. 
 137. See Foster, supra note 20, at 1097–1100 (describing Ortiz’s theory and then 
introducing her own). 
 138. Id. at 1121. 
 139. Id. at 1118–21. 
 140. Id. at 1122. 
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and Foster’s accounts are incomplete descriptions of the relationship 
between the intent doctrine and the standard employed in the vote dilution 
cases. 
First, both authors oversimplify the difference between the evidentiary 
burden imposed in the vote dilution cases and that imposed in the trilogy.  It 
is not merely a matter of the Court applying a more lenient standard in the 
vote dilution cases than it did in the trilogy.  What is particularly distinct is 
that according to the trilogy, the challenger’s burden is to prove the actual 
motivations of a state actor that adopts a law.141  But in the vote dilution 
cases, the burden is to show that the law operates in a political and social 
context that leads it to produce discriminatory consequences.142  Neither 
Ortiz nor Foster explain why a plaintiff must prove the motivations of an 
actual perpetrator of discrimination in one set of cases and only the 
operation of the law in its present setting in the vote dilution cases. 
Second, neither author is able to explain why some voting cases decided 
after the vote dilution cases continue to use an intent standard.  For 
example, in cases involving challenges to the alleged race-conscious 
drawing of electoral district lines, the Court has again focused on the actual 
motivation of state actors rather than the operation of the law.143  Neither 
Ortiz nor Foster provides any basis for distinguishing one subset of voting 
cases from another. 
Third, while Ortiz recognizes that in the vote dilution cases the Court is 
in fact judging substantive outcomes rather than correcting procedural 
defects,144 he never defines the particular baseline against which the Court 
judges these outcomes.  Failure to identify the Court’s baseline leaves 
Ortiz’s descriptive theory of the equal protection standard incomplete, or at 
the very least unsatisfying.  A standard that looks to substantive outcomes 
unmoored from a defined end is essentially arbitrary. 
Both Ortiz and Foster provide an initial foundation for understanding the 
disaggregated intent standard by noting that the importance of voting and 
electoral structures plays a role in altering the intent standard applied by the 
Court.  However, important gaps remain in the explanation of the 
distinction between the standard the Court employed in the vote dilution 
cases and the one it employed in the trilogy.  In the next two Parts, I fill 
those gaps, first through an interpretation of doctrine, and second through a 
more normative justification of the doctrinal account. 
 
 141. See supra notes 44–54 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 95–111 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (establishing the plaintiff’s burden 
as a showing that “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to 
place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district”); Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to “redistricting legislation that is so 
bizarre on its face that it is ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race’”). 
 144. Ortiz, supra note 20, at 1129 (arguing that in the vote dilution cases, the effect of the 
Court’s rationale “is to make intent largely coextensive with adverse impact in voting 
cases”). 
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II.  THE REPRESENTATIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE 
Election law scholars have thus far treated the reapportionment cases that 
established the requirement of one-person, one-vote as unrelated to the 
operative effects standard employed in the vote dilution cases.  In this Part, 
I argue that the distinctive standard employed in Bolden and Rogers did not 
arise in a vacuum.  Instead, the best way to make sense of the operative 
effects standard is by recognizing its relationship—from both the 
perspective of doctrine and democratic theory—to the standard employed in 
the one-person, one-vote cases. 
Much has been written about the cases that made up the so-called 
reapportionment revolution145—a set of cases beginning with Baker v. 
Carr146 in 1960 and culminating in 1964 with the decision in Reynolds v. 
Sims147 that adopted one-person, one-vote as the standard for evaluating 
apportionments under the Equal Protection Clause.148  In this Part, I focus 
on identifying the contours of a representative equality principle in these 
cases.  Specifically, I argue that the Court, through the reapportionment 
revolution, is best understood as having established a representative 
equality principle that encompassed not only the familiar democratic 
principle of individual political equality and majority rule, but also the 
principle of effective representation of minorities.  This latter aspect took 
shape in the decisions that followed directly after the reapportionment 
cases.  It is against this baseline that districting practices alleged to dilute 
the vote are measured. 
The judicial development of this substantive constitutional principle 
cannot be divorced from the concurrently shifting landscape of democratic 
theory.  The previously dominant Madisonian theory of democracy had 
been principally concerned with constraining majority factions from 
tyrannizing minorities and had therefore been used to justify minority 
vetoes of majority decisions.149  The disproportionate political strength of 
rural voters in malapportioned legislative districts was one version of such a 
minority veto.  But the pluralist theory that emerged and became dominant 
 
 145. See, e.g., STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF 
INEQUALITY:  ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2008); GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER:  THE 
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (2002); ROBERT G. 
DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:  REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 
(1968); Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases:  One Person, One Vote—One Vote, 
One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and 
Equipopulous Gerrymandering:  A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective 
Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277; Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 1697 (1999); Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote:  A Mantra in Need of 
Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases:  
Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2000); Phil 
C. Neal, Baker v. Carr:  Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 252. 
 146. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 147. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 148. The other cases are Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
 149. See infra notes 162–64 and accompanying text. 
2012] THE REPRESENTATIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE 203 
during the middle part of the twentieth century rejected majority factions as 
mythical in a democracy comprising so many diverse interest groups.150  
Instead, pluralist theory equated majority rule with “minorities rule,” 
describing a system in which a majority governing at any particular time 
simply comprised a coalition of minority groups.  These majority coalitions 
constantly shifted to encompass new and different groups as a result of 
bargaining between minority groups and changes to the political context. 
The principal concern within the pluralist model was therefore not 
majority tyranny, but rather breakdowns in the pluralist marketplace in 
which dominant coalitions of minorities tyrannized other, less powerful 
minorities by permanently frustrating their will, principally through in-
groups’ exclusion of out-groups from the political bargaining process.  It 
was this shift from Madisonianism to pluralism that I argue animated the 
Court’s rejection of a minority veto in the reapportionment cases.  
However, while the Court was acquiescing in a representative equality 
principle of majority rule, it was simultaneously articulating a coordinate 
principle of effective representation, which ensured marginalized minorities 
access to the political process.  What follows is an interpretive account of 
the reapportionment revolution, beginning with some background to the 
revolution. 
Before engaging this discussion, a quick note on the methodology 
employed in this Part.  My goal is to develop a principled explanation that 
lends coherence to the doctrine as an ideal jurist would do in approaching 
these precedents.  In Part III, I go on to argue that this explanation is not 
only principled and coherent but rests on strong normative justifications 
regarding the Court’s role in a democracy. 
A.  Background 
In the United States, political representation in the federal House of 
Representatives and state legislatures is secured through districting—the 
process of creating geographic entities comprised of residents responsible 
for electing a collective representative.  The Constitution in Article I, 
Section 4 gives states the authority to apportion legislative districts.151  
However, nothing in the Constitution establishes any explicit standard for 
how states are supposed to apportion their districts.152  Historically, states 
have primarily employed one of two types of districting schemes:  single-
member districts in which residents of each district elect one representative 
to the legislative body and multi-member, or at-large, districts in which all 
the residents of each district jointly elect multiple representatives to the 
 
 150. See infra notes 209–16 and accompanying text. 
 151. Article I, Section 4 states:  “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 152. See CHARLES W. EAGLES, DEMOCRACY DELAYED:  CONGRESSIONAL 
REAPPORTIONMENT AND URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT IN THE 1920S, at 22 (1990). 
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legislative body.153  In most of the early states, districts apportioned for at 
least one house of the state legislature were comprised of individual towns 
or counties, which ensured the representation of political subdivisions in the 
state and federal legislature.154 
Most states also mandated in their founding constitutions that at least one 
house of the state legislature be composed of representatives elected from 
equally apportioned districts.155  Although counting mechanisms and 
apportionment baselines were often disputed, states drawing on ideas of 
popular sovereignty sought to maintain for at least one house the equal 
representation of the people.156  But this was rarely achieved in practice.157  
Urbanization from the mid-nineteenth century forward resulted in dramatic 
declines in population in rural districts.158  Rather than reapportion districts 
to account for the changing demographic landscape, rural legislators, 
unwilling to relinquish political power to the burgeoning cities, used their 
majorities in state legislatures to obstruct any change to district lines.159  By 
the middle of the twentieth century, decades of legislative inaction had left 
many state and federal legislative districts grossly malapportioned and rural 
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regions entirely overrepresented.160  The result of this arrangement was 
minority rule in many states.161 
State legislators representing rural districts justified malapportioned 
districts on the basis of the Madisonian democratic ideal of avoiding the 
tyranny of the majority.  In particular, rural state legislators defended these 
districts as a means of protecting rural interest groups from being 
overridden by a dominant, monolithic urban majority.162  They analogized 
to the constitutional protection given, through the operation of the U.S. 
Senate, to lesser-populated states against tyranny of the majority by the 
more heavily populated states.163  The even distribution of political power 
to the states in this body acted to dilute the votes of individuals in the 
higher-population states.164  Malapportioned districts likewise protected 
against majority tyranny by providing rural interest groups with a minority 
veto against an urban majority with adverse interests.165 
The problem with this theoretical justification for malapportioned 
districts was that it lacked supporting evidence.  Particularly, there was 
nothing to indicate that urban interests comprised a monolithic majority 
with interests adverse to those of their rural counterparts.  In fact, there was 
evidence to suggest that urban and rural residents shared overlapping 
interests, including shared political party affiliations that would serve as the 
principal protection against one group tyrannizing the other.166  The 
theoretical arguments from Madisonian theory instead bore all the 
resemblances of a post hoc justification to preserve the power of certain 
state legislators. 
Nonetheless, since malapportioned districts often gave disproportionate 
power to the majority of state legislators who represented lesser-populated 
districts, these legislators had every incentive to maintain the  system.  They 
did so even in the absence of evidence of a monolithic urban majority 
determined to tyrannize rural interest groups.  At the same time, the hands 
of the judiciary seemed tied.  Both the state and federal courts refused to 
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interfere with what they deemed to be the exclusive prerogative of the state 
legislatures to draw district lines.167 
Theoretical understandings of democracy, however, were shifting.  The 
Supreme Court reversed course in 1960, entering what Justice Frankfurter 
famously described as the “political thicket” of apportionment.168  In the 
process, the Court established a substantive baseline for measuring the 
constitutionality of all future districting schemes. 
B.  The Representative Equality Principle:  Majority Rule 
Before the Court entered into the political thicket of reapportionment in 
Baker, Justice Black, in an earlier case, had planted the seeds for the future 
development of a principle of representative equality premised on majority 
rule.  This principle would serve as the basis for protecting the rights of 
members of majority coalitions against a minority veto maintained through 
malapportioned districts.  Ultimately, it would also serve as the substantive 
baseline for measuring the constitutionality of malapportioned districts 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 
In Colegrove v. Green, a plurality of the Court decided not to reach the 
merits of a challenge to the constitutionality of malapportioned federal 
congressional districts.169  The plurality explained that controversies 
surrounding malapportioned districts were “not meet for judicial 
determination” because they involved questions peculiarly political in 
nature and involved harms suffered not by private individuals but by the 
polity as a whole.170  The political branches of the state government, the 
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 168. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
 169. Id. at 552. 
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plurality concluded, should resolve these controversies about the proper 
allocation of political power.171 
For Justice Black, writing in dissent, the question of the constitutionality 
of malapportioned districts was justiciable because it implicated individual 
rights.172  This conclusion, however, was ultimately premised on an 
assumption about the proper structure of representative government.  
Justice Black explained that “the constitutionally guaranteed right to vote 
and the right to have one’s vote counted clearly imply that state election 
systems, no matter what their form, should be designed to give 
approximately equal weight to each vote cast.”173 
Implicit within Justice Balck’s idea that a system should be designed to 
give approximately equal weight to each vote cast was a suggestion about 
the form of election system that states should maintain.  Some of the 
particularities of that form were revealed later in Justice Black’s Colegrove 
dissent, where he argued that the mandate of equal apportionment of 
districts between the states under Article I, Section 2 was directed at 
making “illegal a nation-wide ‘rotten borough’ system.”174  This was a 
reference to the oft-maligned “rotten borough” system of England in which 
some members of Parliament represented boroughs with very few residents, 
a system that led to the devaluation of the vote of residents for members of 
Parliament who represented high population boroughs.175  The purpose of 
Article I, Section 2 was therefore to establish a system of representation in 
the House that would prohibit inequities in the effectiveness of an 
individual’s vote.  Under this provision, “[a]ll groups, classes, and 
individuals shall to the extent that it is practically feasible be given equal 
representation in the House of Representatives, which, in conjunction with 
the Senate, writes the laws affecting the life, liberty, and property of all the 
people.”176 
Justice Black’s dissent thus reflected an understanding that the 
Constitution not only protects the individual right to vote, but also the right 
to an effective vote, which is to be measured in accordance with a structure 
of government considered appropriately representative.  That structure of 
government is one that provides the people with equal representation.  
While this account seems uncontroversial now, this was not the only or 
even dominant basis of representation then.  For alternatives, one could 
look to the system of representation by geography in the federal Senate and 
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in many state houses, which were designed to ensure that the voices of 
political sub-entities would be heard.177  Such apportionments were often 
justified as a means for securing interest-based representation for distinct 
groups.178 
Notably, if the constitutionality of a districting scheme depends on 
whether it provides an effective vote measured according to the proper form 
of representative government, it follows that the legislative motivation 
behind the challenged scheme should be irrelevant to the constitutional 
inquiry.  This fits with Justice Black’s conclusion that “[w]hether 
[malapportionment] was due to negligence or was a wilful effort to deprive 
some citizens of an effective vote, the admitted result is that the 
constitutional policy of equality of representation has been defeated.”179  In 
other words, it did not matter whether state legislators intended to draw 
malapportioned districts to deprive individuals of an effective vote or not.  
What mattered was that malapportioned districts operated in a manner that 
deprived individuals of an equally effective vote. 
It would take fifteen years for the Court to finally move in the direction 
of Justice Black’s dissent, and when it did, it initially did so only in a 
halfway and unsustainable manner.  In Baker, voters challenged 
malapportioned state legislative districts in Tennessee under the Equal 
Protection Clause.180  The Court rejected the Colegrove plurality’s non-
justiciability finding and held that such claims were in fact justiciable.181  
To reach this conclusion, the Court distinguished equal protection 
challenges to malapportioned districts from those claims that could be made 
under the clause guaranteeing a republican form of government, which the 
Court continued to consider nonjusticiable.  In the process of distinguishing 
the two types of claims, the Court tried to frame the equal protection claim 
in exclusively rights-based terms in order to contrast it with the structural 
concerns that underlay the Guarantee Clause. 
The majority explained that claims under the Guarantee Clause182 were 
non-justiciable because of the lack of a manageable judicial standard for 
assessing when a government is republican in form.183  In contrast, 
“[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause [were] well 
developed and familiar.”184  Those standards focus on the process of 
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decision making, invalidating laws that discriminate against individuals if 
the “discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious 
action.”185  As Justice Clark elaborated in his concurrence, this would 
subject to invalidation only those malapportionments that were so “topsy-
turvical” that they lacked any rational design.186 
The Baker standard, which focused on the process of designing the 
districts, proved unsustainable because it was divorced from any 
articulation of the right in question.  The malapportionment of state 
legislative districts did not discriminatorily or otherwise deprive anyone of 
their right to vote.  Nor did it deprive individuals of the opportunity to have 
their votes counted.  The process-based inquiry left undefined what the state 
was arbitrarily and capriciously doing that was unconstitutional through its 
malapportionment of districts.  Justice Frankfurter, writing in dissent, 
identified this weakness in the majority’s attempt to frame the equal 
protection claim in rights-based terms without identifying the particular 
right that was being discriminatorily denied.  He asserted that the challenge 
to the malapportioned districts was simply a democratic structure-based 
“Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label.”187  The 
litigants’ complaint against the state system of malapportionment was 
simply that “the basis of representation . . . hurts them” by allowing a 
minority to rule.188  Such a claim, Justice Frankfurter maintained, is 
nonjusticiable under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Guarantee 
Clause because it involves the federal court in a political debate that it is not 
competent to engage.189 
The Court was incompetent because the challengers’ attempt to frame the 
issue as a personal one about the debasement or dilution of their vote 
requires a political assessment about the proper form of representation for 
which the Court lacks comparative insight.  To assess whether a vote has 
been diluted such that an individual is not able to effectively influence the 
political process requires a determination of the level of influence that the 
Constitution assures any individual.  As Justice Frankfurter explained, 
“[S]ince ‘equal protection of the laws’ can only mean an equality of persons 
standing in the same relation to whatever governmental action is 
challenged, the determination whether treatment is equal presupposes a 
determination concerning the nature of the relationship.”190  This 
determination, “with respect to apportionment, means an inquiry into the 
theoretic base of representation in an acceptably republican state.”191  In 
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other words, in addressing the dilutive effects of an apportionment, the 
equal protection of the individual cannot be divorced from a finding about 
the proper form of representative government. 
Two years after Baker, the Court returned to the question of the 
constitutionality of malapportioned federal congressional districts in 
Georgia.  For the first time, the Court in Wesberry v. Sanders192 held these 
districts unconstitutional, and it did so under Article I, Section 2.193  In 
rationalizing this invalidation, the Court placed much greater emphasis than 
the majority in Baker on the deficiencies of such districts from the 
perspective of representative government rather than individual rights.  In 
doing so, it took a step avoided in Baker toward defining the proper form of 
representative government against which malapportioned districts would be 
judged. 
The Court interpreted the requirement under Article I, Section 2 that 
representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States” to mean that 
“as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to 
be worth as much as another’s.”194  This interpretation, the Court explained, 
was derived from the intent of the Framers of the Constitution who desired 
to establish through this provision a House of Representatives that was 
fundamentally democratic.195  To define what it meant for the House to be 
democratic, the majority returned to the argument Justice Black introduced 
in his dissent in Colegrove.196  It defined the democratic structure that the 
Framers sought to create in the House in contrast to the rotten borough 
system of Parliament in England that they wanted to avoid.197  In this more 
democratically structured House, the people should be able to elect 
members of the House and “each voter should have a voice equal to that of 
every other in electing members of Congress.”198  In other words, the 
Framers sought to create in the House a democratic structure that 
guaranteed equal representation for equal numbers of people.199 
The Court left two fundamental questions unaddressed, even as it 
articulated this ideal ofdemocratic government as securing political 
equality.  The first question revolved around the principle that underlay the 
idea of equal representation.  Is the goal simply equality for equality’s sake, 
or is there some other democratic principle that underlies this goal?  The 
second question concerned the problem of malapportioned state legislative 
districts that are not subject to the mandate of Article I, Section 2.  Did the 
Court intend after Wesberry that federal congressional districts would be 
constitutionally required under Article I, Section 2 to be equally 
apportioned while state legislative districts could remain malapportioned so 
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long as the apportionment was not done in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner under the Equal Protection Clause? 
In Reynolds, a case decided the same year as Wesberry, both sets of 
questions were answered through the judicial construction of a 
representative equality principle under the Equal Protection Clause.  This 
principle identified the democratic basis for the goal of equal representation 
and applied it to state legislative apportionments.  In particular, the Court 
explicitly adopted majority rule as a central democratic objective that 
mandated the invalidation of even those rationally created malapportioned 
districts.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court tried to avoid Justice 
Frankfurter’s criticism in Baker that, through its imposition of a particular 
theory of representative government, the Court was masquerading a 
Guarantee Clause claim under the label of equal protection.  The Court did 
so again by attempting to frame the issue in individual-rights based terms.  
But in doing so, it clearly conceded that these individual rights claims 
would be addressed differently from others it had previously recognized 
under the Equal Protection Clause.  The most important difference being 
that the determination of whether the right in question was violated would 
not be based on whether there was some defect in the process of decision 
making, such that it reflected arbitrariness or capriciousness.  Instead, it 
would be based on a determination of whether the state reapportionment 
operated contrary to the representative equality principle of majority rule. 
As Justice Black had done in dissent in Colegrove, the majority in 
Reynolds defined the individual right at stake in the malapportionment of 
districts as derivative of the right to vote. In an oft-quoted passage, the 
Court explained, 
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence 
of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the 
heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be 
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as 
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.200 
Rather than avoiding the question that the assertion of vote dilution 
naturally raises—dilution as compared to what—the Court adopted and 
elaborated upon the baseline of representative equality established in 
Wesberry.  An individual’s vote has been diluted when she has been 
deprived of the equal representation that is fundamental to democratic 
government.201  It is fundamental because in a democracy premised on 
representative government, a majority of the voters must be able to elect a 
majority of the legislators “responsible for enacting laws by which all 
citizens are to be governed.”202  Marrying the principle of representative 
government to the individual right to an undiluted vote, the Court declared 
that if a democratic government of laws is to be sustained, “the overriding 
objective [of apportionment] must be substantial equality of population 
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among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately 
equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the state.”203  In other words, 
the principle of representative equality requires “one person, one vote.”204 
The Court’s opinion in Reynolds is best explained as adopting majority 
rule as a principal baseline value underlying representative equality.  
Evidence in support of that interpretation can be found in the Court’s 
explicit subordination of other bases of representation that did not depend 
on majority rule.  The Court in Reynolds dismissed a theory of 
representative government premised on geography, confidently asserting 
that “[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres.  Legislators are 
elected by voters, not farms or cities.”205 
Importantly, the Court also rejected a Madisonian conception of 
representative government.  As Justice Stewart emphasized in dissent, from 
a Madisonian perspective, the prioritization of majority rule undermines 
interest-based representation by allowing a monolithic majority to control 
outcomes and subordinate “a medley of component voices” that represent 
minorities in society.206  The Court’s response to this alternative theory of 
representative government was just as dismissive as its rejection of a 
geographic basis of representation.  Implicitly relying on the rights-
protective provisions of the Constitution, it explained that there are other 
constitutional means that provide for the protection of members of minority 
groups.207  And these other means according to the Court, make a system 
that guarantees minority rule over majorities unnecessary.208 
Lying in the background of the Court’s rather blithe response to concerns 
about insufficient representation of minority interests was a shift in political 
theory away from a fixation on the power of a monolithic majority.  The 
pluralist theory of democracy associated with political scientists such as 
Robert Dahl, Earl Latham, and David Truman, had emerged as one of the 
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dominant accounts of representative government by the time the Court 
decided Reynolds.209  And pluralist theory provided a refutation to Justice 
Stewart’s logic. 
Pluralist theory posits that in a well-functioning political marketplace, 
rule by a monolithic majority is a myth.210  Many individuals with diverse 
interests comprise the United States.  The possibility that a monolithic 
majority will emerge from this panoply of interests, the theory holds, is 
therefore simply unimaginable.211  Rather, majority rule is really 
“minorities rule” in that any majority that governs at any point in time will 
be comprised of a coalition of several minority groups with crosscutting and 
overlapping interests.212  Importantly, the minority groups comprising the 
in-group coalition in power will ordinarily include members with 
overlapping and crosscutting allegiances with members of minority groups 
out of power.213  These overlapping and crosscutting allegiances between 
members of the in-group and out-group serve as the principal protection 
against tyranny of the majority over the interests of the minorities.  They do 
so by ensuring that the majority accounts for and considers the interests of 
the minority in its decision making.214 
Another protection against majority tyranny, according to pluralist 
theory, is the inherent instability of majority coalitions.  The on-going 
political bargaining between interest groups along with changes in the 
political context can lead to shifts in the composition of the coalition that 
has the ultimate power to govern.215  Thus, in a properly operating pluralist 
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marketplace, minorities are usually protected against permanent frustration 
of their political will.  A minority out of power one day can be part of the 
majority in power the next through participation in the give and take of a 
competitive political marketplace.216  This process of minority interest 
bargaining and coalition building provides the additional layer of protection 
that renders unnecessary a guarantee of minority rule for the representation 
of minority interests. 
Applying this theory to the reapportionment cases, residents of rural 
districts, or any other ordinary minority, did not need the extra protection of 
a minority veto provided by malapportioned districts.  Assuming that a 
particular minority had the opportunity to engage in the give and take of 
politics, their interests would be protected through a process of 
accommodation and compromise in the pluralist marketplace. 
The Court in Reynolds should thus be understood as having adopted a 
substantive constitutional principle of representative government under the 
Equal Protection Clause that was premised on equal representation and 
majority rule.  In the process, it established an equal protection standard 
that invalidated malapportioned districts, not because they were adopted 
with impure motives, but because they operated in a way that conflicted 
with this principle.  The triumph of substance over process is evidenced by 
the Court’s clear rejection of a process basis, offered by Justice Clark in his 
Reynolds concurrence, for invalidating the malapportioned districts.  In this 
concurrence, Justice Clark suggested that the Court should have simply held 
that the apportionment scheme was arbitrary, in that it constituted “a crazy 
quilt” that revealed invidious discrimination in its creation.217  Despite the 
seeming simplicity of such reasoning and its consistency with the Court’s 
past equal protection jurisprudence, no other justice joined Justice Clark’s 
concurrence. 
C.  The Representative Equality Principle:  Effective Representation 
The general scholarly consensus is that Reynolds marked the culmination 
of the reapportionment revolution.218  I argue, however, that in the years 
following Reynolds, the reapportionment revolution continued and the 
representative equality principle evolved in the face of newer types of equal 
protection challenges to districting and apportionment.  Political equality 
and majority rule remained as the central mandate for the apportionment of 
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electoral districts.219  But the Court’s response to vote dilution claims in 
subsequent cases reveal an additional imperative under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  This imperative, which focused on providing minorities with 
equally effective representation in the political process, is traceable to the 
pluralist account that the political marketplace is not always inclusive of all 
interests. 
Just before the reapportionment revolution, a leading political scientist, 
Robert Dahl, published an important book criticizing Madisonian 
democratic theory:  A Preface to Democratic Theory.  In it, Dahl suggested 
that rather than fixating on concerns about majority tyranny, “the more 
relevant question is the extent to which various minorities in a society will 
frustrate the ambitions of one another.”220  In a society where members of 
groups hold multiple identities and interests and in which social cleavages 
are crosscutting and overlapping, this concern is not particularly 
pressing.221  Members of a frustrated minority group can always use their 
membership in, and allegiance to, other groups to garner support for their 
interests to prevent the submergence of their will.  But Dahl was writing in 
the context of enduring societal divisions.  He likely recognized the reality 
that rather than being crosscutting and overlapping, some cleavages were 
deep and reinforcing and that these latter cleavages arose from deep-seated 
animus and distrust between certain groups.222  Because of these deep and 
reinforcing social cleavages, certain groups face great difficulty in creating 
political coalitions with members of other groups, even those other groups 
with which they share some aspect of identity or interest.  This leads to the 
political marginalization of certain groups who are left out of the political 
bargaining process in the pluralist marketplace.  And unless the 
marginalized group comprises a majority in an electoral jurisdiction,223 this 
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can lead to the permanent frustration of the will of that group and the 
group’s exclusion from any influence over policymaking. 
The judicial doctrine that developed in the years following Reynolds 
reflected an awareness of this potential breakdown in the pluralist 
marketplace.  A central concern was redressing structural impediments to 
opportunities for politically marginalized minorities to influence the 
political process.224  In this doctrinal development, the focus of judicial 
scrutiny was more on the operative effects of the structural impediment 
rather than the process of their adoption. 
The seeds of this doctrine emerged in response to an equal protection 
challenge to the election of state senators in multi-member at-large districts 
in Fortson v. Dorsey.225  In Reynolds, the Court had held that at-large 
districts in which multiple legislators were elected from one district were 
not unconstitutional per se so long as they complied with the one-person, 
one-vote requirement.226  The district at issue in Fortson complied with this 
mandate.  Seven state senators represented a multi-member district that had 
approximately seven times the population of other single-member state 
senatorial districts in Georgia.227  Nonetheless, the challengers claimed that 
the multi-member district submerged the interests of members of minority 
groups residing in it.228  They explained that it did so by making it more 
difficult for minorities in the larger multi-member districts to build majority 
coalitions to influence elections than it was for minorities in the smaller 
single-member districts.229  The Court ultimately rejected this claim and a 
similar claim brought the next year in Hawaii for lack of evidence that the 
interest of the particular group had been submerged.230 
Significantly, though, the Court in Fortson left the door open to future 
challenges to multi-member districts.  The Court explained, “[O]ur opinion 
is not to be understood to say that in all instances or under all circumstances 
such a system . . . will comport with the dictates of the Equal Protection 
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Clause.”231  It also proffered a standard for evaluating such claims:  “It 
might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency 
apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would 
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political 
elements of the voting population.”232 
Notably, the Fortson standard specifically rejects a pure process-based 
approach to addressing claims of interest submergence or vote dilution.  
Whether there is a defect in the political process that causes the 
apportionment scheme to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of 
racial or political elements is ultimately irrelevant.  Instead, the central issue 
is whether the scheme “operates” in a way that minimizes or cancels out the 
voting strength of particular groups.  This suggests, at the very least, 
judicial recognition that there is some substantive value relevant to the 
evaluation of these claims of vote dilution.  As with any standard that 
focuses on the operation of a state law, there must be a baseline for 
measuring when the state law violates the Constitution—in this context, a 
baseline for determining when a state apportionment scheme has 
unacceptably minimized or cancelled out the voting strength of a racial or 
political element. 
Two cases decided in the early 1970s are best understood as developing 
the contours of a constitutional baseline of effective representation in the 
political process as an addendum to the representative equality principle.  
This baseline of effective representation provided a subsequent guide for 
the Court’s choice of standards in Bolden and Rogers. 
In the first case, Whitcomb v. Chavis,233 poor black residents of the 
Center Township Ghetto in Marion County, Indiana, claimed that the multi-
member districting scheme in place in the county submerged their 
interests.234  The challengers did not try to argue that the State of Indiana 
intentionally adopted the multi-member districting scheme to minimize or 
cancel out their vote.  In fact, they conceded that there was no basis for such 
a claim since the multi-member districting scheme was adopted at a time 
when there were no substantial ethnic or racial enclaves in Marion 
County.235 
Instead, the challengers relied on the standard developed in Fortson, 
which required them to prove that the multi-member constituency 
apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of the case, would operate 
to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements 
of the voting population.  They therefore based their case on evidence from 
the political and social context in which the multi-member scheme 
operated, to argue that the scheme deprived them of effective representation 
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in the political process.236  This included evidence that residents of the 
Center Township Ghetto shared distinctive interests in such things as 
“housing regulations, sanitation, welfare programs, garnishment statutes, 
and unemployment compensations, among other others.”237  They presented 
evidence showing that state legislators elected in the multi-member district 
disproportionately hailed from other parts of the county and proved 
unresponsive to the community’s interests.238  Finally, the challengers 
offered evidence showing that residents of the Center Township Ghetto 
would be able to elect candidates of their choice who would be responsive 
to their interests if the state replaced the multi-member district with single-
member districts.239 
As it had done in the prior two challenges to multi-member districts,240 
the Court rejected the claim of the residents of the Center Township Ghetto 
because they had not proven that the multi-member district diluted their 
vote.241  As the Court explained, the fact that Center Township Ghetto 
residents were not able to elect a proportionate number of state legislators 
responsive to their needs and interests did not, in itself, prove a claim of 
vote dilution.242  Rather, the residents had to show that the electoral scheme 
deprived them of the opportunity “to participate in the political process[] 
and to elect legislators of their choice.”243  This, the Court explained, they 
had not done.244  Rather than reflecting the lack of opportunity to influence 
the political process, the unresponsiveness of Marion County legislators 
resulted from the fact that Republicans had won four of the five elections 
from 1960 to 1968 while the residents of the Center Township ghetto had 
voted overwhelmingly Democratic.245  During this time, the Democratic 
Party had shown itself to be inclusive of the residents’ interests.  The party 
had slated candidates from the Center Township Ghetto in the one election 
that the party won, and there was no evidence that they had failed to slate 
such candidates in the other elections.246  The Court therefore inferred that 
had the Democrats won more than one election, the interests of the Center 
Township Ghetto would have been more fully represented.247 
While the Court rejected the vote dilution claim in Whitcomb, it 
nonetheless reaffirmed the Fortson standard for valid vote dilution claims, 
which focused on the operation of the electoral scheme rather than the 
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process of its adoption.248  A lack of proportionate representation, however, 
was determined in Whitcomb to not be the proper constitutional baseline for 
assessing whether a scheme cancelled out or minimized the voting strength 
of racial or political elements under the Fortson standard.  Instead, the 
Court in Whitcomb suggested that access to the political process in terms of 
the effective opportunity to influence electoral outcomes would be the 
appropriate baseline for assessing whether the pluralist marketplace was 
functioning properly.  It explained: 
The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the 
outcome of . . . elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative 
seats of its own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies 
where, as here, there is no indication that . . . the population is being 
denied access to the political system.249 
Whitcomb left open an important question:  what evidence would be 
necessary to show that an electoral structure operated to deprive a racial or 
political element of access to the political process?  The Court answered 
this question two years later in White v. Regester,250 when it unanimously 
invalidated two multi-member voting districts in Texas because they 
provided members of two politically marginalized racial groups with less 
opportunity than other residents “to participate in the political process[] and 
to elect legislators of their choice.”251 
In Dallas County, Texas, African Americans, who comprised nearly 25 
percent of the one million residents, registered and voted freely.252  Yet 
they had only elected two blacks to the Texas House of Representatives 
since Reconstruction in the mid-nineteenth century.253  These two were the 
only blacks ever slated by the Dallas Committee for Responsible 
Government (DCRG), the chief Democratic candidate slating organization 
in Dallas County.254  In contrast to the situation in Marion County, Indiana, 
where African Americans excluded by one political party could presumably 
join and support the opposing political party, Texas was essentially a one 
party state in which the Democratic Party controlled most elected offices.255  
The party primary was therefore the only election that really mattered.  This 
meant that the DCRG exerted a great degree of control over who would be 
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selected for office through its decision about which candidate to slate for 
elected office.256  Its refusal to involve blacks in the slating process acted as 
a major impediment to black access to the political process in Dallas 
County by eliminating the opportunity for them to influence which 
candidate would be elected at this pivotal stage of selection.257 
In addition, the DCRG refused to slate candidates responsive to African 
Americans because it did not need the support of members of the black 
community to secure election in the county.258  The DCRG likely 
recognized that blacks were politically isolated in a county with a racially 
polarized electorate in which most white voters refused to vote for black 
candidates or even candidates responsive to black interests.  Those few 
candidates that did try to appeal to the interests of the black community 
suffered electoral costs as the DCRG engaged in racially charged campaign 
tactics designed (usually successfully) to appeal to white voters who were 
intent on punishing these candidates.259  Given this dynamic, any candidate 
that made it through the nomination process could not fairly be seen as 
responsive to the black community in Dallas.  This lack of responsiveness 
combined with other electoral rules to effectively prevent blacks from 
“enter[ing] into the political process in a reliable and meaningful 
manner.”260 
Similarly, Mexican-Americans in Bexar County, Texas, were found to 
have little opportunity to influence the political process.  This group, which 
comprised 29 percent of the county, had suffered deprivation in the areas of 
education, employment, economics, housing, and health.261  Their lack of 
influence followed from a history of political exclusion in which, as the 
district court described, “a cultural incompatibility . . . conjoined with the 
poll tax and the most restrictive voter registration procedures . . . operated 
to effectively deny Mexican-Americans access to the political processes in 
Texas.”262  The Court concluded that in Bexar County, “[s]ingle member 
districts were . . . required to remedy ‘the effects of past and present 
discrimination against Mexican-Americans,’ and to bring the community 
into the full stream of political life of the county and State by encouraging 
their further registration, voting, and other political activities.”263 
Consistent with the Court’s approach in Whitcomb and the standard first 
articulated in Fortson, none of the evidence on which the Court relied in 
White to invalidate the multi-member districts in Texas had anything to do 
with the process of adoption of the electoral scheme.  The Court instead 
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squarely focused on evidence from the context in which the multi-member 
electoral structures operated to support its invalidation of the structures.  
Specifically, it measured the operation of the two multi-member schemes 
against the constitutional baseline of access to the political process and 
found that they both operated in an unconstitutional manner—a manner that 
undermined representative equality.  The Fifth Circuit would later 
summarize the evidence relevant to prove an equal protection violation 
under the standard articulated in White.  The circuit court explained that 
members of a minority group can prove dilution through “an aggregate of 
. . . factors [including] lack of access to the process of slating candidates, 
the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a 
tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large 
districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in general precludes 
the effective participation in the election system.”264 
What is notable about this list is that none of the evidence listed is 
focused on showing that the multi-member districts themselves cause 
politically marginalized groups to be deprived of the opportunity to 
influence the political process.  Rather, the multi-member system is viewed 
as a structural impediment to remedying a breakdown in the pluralist 
marketplace at the societal level in which structural cleavages—reinforced 
by animus, distrust, and indifference—serve as obstacles to political 
coalition building between groups.  The constitutional objective in these 
contexts was to force states to establish single-member districts in their 
stead.  These districts would provide members of previously excluded racial 
groups with an opportunity to influence the electoral process through 
political bargaining in smaller districts comprised of residents open to 
including those groups in the majority coalition. 
With its decision in White, the Court put in place the second part of the 
basic doctrinal structure underlying the representative equality principle.  
Not only are electoral structures that operate to undermine individual 
political equality and majority rule unconstitutional, electoral structures that 
operate to deprive minorities of the opportunity for representation in the 
political process violate the Equal Protection Clause as well.   
There is important evidence that the representative equality principle was 
intended as a separate basis for evaluating certain laws under the Equal 
Protection Clause providing a distinct standard from the antidiscrimination 
principle that the Court reaffirmed in the Davis trilogy.  In Davis, the Court 
extensively discussed several of its prior equal protection cases involving 
education, welfare, racial gerrymandering, and jury selection to support its 
argument that a process-based perpetrator intent standard had always been 
employed in the equal protection context.265  It also disapprovingly cited 
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402 U.S. 137 (1971); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (jury selection); Carter v. Jury 
Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Whitus v. Georgia, 
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several lower court opinions establishing a disparate impact test for 
employment discrimination claims.266  Yet the Court never discussed or 
cited any of the one-person, one-vote cases or the vote dilution cases that 
collectively established the representative equality principle.  This omission 
of the reapportionment cases should not be considered a simple oversight 
for two important reasons:  First, the reapportionment cases were 
particularly salient at the time that the Court decided Davis, as reflected in 
the parallel adjudications in which the Court cited and relied on the 
reasoning in those cases.  Second, and perhaps more tellingly, Justice White 
wrote the majority opinion in both White and Davis.  This suggests that the 
Court saw the reapportionment cases as addressing a distinct problem that 
required the adoption of a distinct standard. 
In sum, the best explanation for what the Court did in the 
reapportionment revolution was to define the two principal imperatives 
underlying the representative equality principle—majority rule and 
effective representation for minority groups.  These imperatives implicitly 
served as the constitutional baseline for the evidentiary standard employed 
by the Court in Bolden and Rogers to evaluate the operation of the electoral 
scheme.  The evidence in Rogers that blacks in Burke County, Georgia, had 
never elected an African American to the Board of Commissioners and had 
little opportunity to elect a candidate responsive to their interests, combined 
with the absence of competition between political parties and the general 
unresponsiveness of the Board to the African American community, 
indicated that the pluralist marketplace had broken down.  In this context, 
the structural impediment of at-large districts had to be removed and 
replaced by single member districts that would provide blacks with equal 
opportunity to influence the political process. 
The reapportionment cases provide a basis for understanding the standard 
employed in Bolden and Rogers, and particularly the constitutional baseline 
that the Court measured the at-large scheme against.  In the next Part I 
argue that the Court’s enforcement of a baseline of representative equality 
is justified as a form of representation-structuring judicial review.  I also 
 
385 U.S. 545 (1967) (jury selection); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) 
(cohabitation statute); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (racial gerrymandering); 
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (jury 
selection); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (jury selection); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 
U.S. 463 (1947); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) (jury selection); Hill v. Texas, 316 
U.S. 400 (1942) (jury selection); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 
306 U.S. 354 (1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) (jury selection); Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (jury selection)).  The Court also explained away cases 
that seemed to turn on disparate impact, arguing that they were in fact cases that looked to 
discriminatory purpose. Id. at 242–43 (citing Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
451 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971)).  The next year, in Arlington 
Heights, the Court asserted that a few other cases that seemed to turn on the operative effect 
of a law were in fact cases about discriminatory purpose. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960) (racial gerrymandering); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (vote denial); 
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (vote denial); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356 (1886) (discriminatory exclusion from a benefit)). 
 266. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 244 n.12. 
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argue that this accords with a proper role for an unaccountable and 
unelected judiciary in a democracy. 
III.  THE REPRESENTATIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE AND REPRESENTATION-
STRUCTURING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Political process theory is one of the most important theories of judicial 
review in a democracy.267  Drawn from the famous footnote four in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.268 and principally developed by John Hart 
Ely, process theory identifies a basis for reconciling the unelected and 
unaccountable judiciary’s role in the review and invalidation of laws with a 
system of democracy in which the laws enacted are responsive and 
accountable to the will of the people.  According to process theory, the two 
principal functions of judicial review in a democracy are clearing the 
channels of political change and facilitating the representation of 
minorities.269  In performing these roles, courts are engaging in 
representation-reinforcing judicial review in which they correct process-
based malfunctions in a representative democracy.  Part of the allure of 
process theory is the idea that it constrains judges to only overturn actions 
of the representative branches when such actions are the product of a 
democratically defective process; by limiting judges to these procedural 
bases for overturning laws, process theory hopes to eliminate or narrow the 
discretion of judges to make substantive value choices.270  A number of 
scholars have described how the intent standard articulated in the Davis 
trilogy, and its focus on the process underlying the adoption of laws, fit 
neatly within this theoretic account.271 
There is, however, potential for conflict between judicial enforcement of 
the representative equality principle on the one hand, which necessarily 
rests on a substantive value choice about the proper form of democratic 
governance, and the process-based account of the Equal Protection Clause 
on the other.  I argue in this Part that the two can be reconciled.  
Representation-reinforcing judicial review is itself premised on a certain 
pluralist conception of representative democracy; even conventional 
process theory requires a substantive value choice in that sense.  In its 
 
 267. See generally ELY, supra note 28.  The theory, however, does not lack competitors 
and it is often criticized. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE 
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 194–99 (1990); Ackerman, supra note 31; Paul Brest, 
The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of 
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 511–16 (1981); Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect 
Politics:  The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721 (1991); Laurence 
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 
1063 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town:  The Contributions of John 
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). But see Michael J. Klarman, 
The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991). 
 268. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 269. See ELY, supra note 28, at 103.   
 270. See id. at 102–03. 
 271. Flagg, supra note 18; Lawrence, supra note 18; David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, 
and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995). But see Ortiz, supra note 20 
(questioning the accepted belief that process theory underlies the intent doctrine). 
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enforcement of the representative equality principle, the Supreme Court is 
working on the basis of a similar political conception of democracy, with 
the difference that in this case its review serves to establish critical 
preconditions for representative democracy. 
In the two subsections that follow, I discuss the two primary 
representation-reinforcing roles that process theorists typically ascribe to 
courts.  I show that although judicial enforcement of the antidiscrimination 
principle in the Davis trilogy and its progeny fits neatly within one of the 
two primary roles, judicial enforcement of the representative equality 
principle does not fit neatly within either role.  Instead, I argue that the 
judicial enforcement of the representative equality principle fits and is 
justified by an essential third role for the Court, the need for which is 
implicit within process theory:  representation-structuring judicial review. 
A.  Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review 
The starting point for process theory is the famous footnote four in 
Carolene Products.  In that footnote, Justice Stone imported into an 
ordinary case an extraordinary account of the function of judicial review in 
a democracy.272  According to this account, the representative institutions 
of government should be responsible for making substantive value choices 
that affect society.273  The role of the courts, through judicial review of 
laws, is to correct systematic malfunctions in the political marketplace.  The 
courts should do so by guarding against two principal defects that indicate 
that the political process is “undeserving of trust.”274  First, courts should 
 
 272. In Carolene Products, the Court applied minimal rational basis scrutiny to evaluate 
the constitutionality of the statute.  Under this standard, the statute had a strong presumption 
of constitutionality.  Justice Stone, however, explained in footnote 4: 
  There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within the specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which 
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. 
     It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those 
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation, is to be subject to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the 
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of 
legislation. 
     Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of 
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities:  whether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).  Paragraphs two and three of 
the footnote are central to the process-theoretic account.  John Hart Ely, the principal 
proponent of process theory interprets paragraph two as designating to the courts the role of 
“keep[ing] the machinery of democratic government running as it should, to make sure the 
channels of political participation and communication are kept open.” ELY, supra note 28, at 
76.  Ely interprets paragraph three as directing courts to “concern [themselves] with what 
majorities do to minorities.” Id. 
 273. ELY, supra note 28, at 103. 
 274. Id. 
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correct defects that arise from “the ins . . . choking off the channels of 
political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay 
out.”275  This is the anti-entrenchment rationale for judicial review.276  
Second, courts should guard against defects in contexts in which “no one is 
actually denied a voice or a vote, [but] representatives beholden to an 
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of 
simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of 
interests.”277  This is the antidiscrimination rationale for judicial review.278  
The responsibility for protecting against entrenchment and discrimination is 
properly given to the Court because elected representatives cannot be 
trusted to identify and rectify either of these defects since they are often the 
source or beneficiaries of the defects.  Judges, on the other hand, are 
relative outsiders and experts in process and therefore well situated to 
properly evaluate and resolve the defects.279 
1.  Anti-entrenchment Review 
Both Ely and current law of politics scholars view the reapportionment 
cases as clear examples of the anti-entrenchment form of representation-
reinforcing judicial review.  Through this anti-entrenchment role, courts are 
responsible for invalidating obstacles to the effective functioning of “the 
democratic process that the legislature itself creates.”280  Ely describes 
restrictions on the vote, including the devaluation of votes through 
malapportionment, as the “quintessential stoppage” in the democratic 
process that the Court has actively reviewed to prevent the ins from choking 
off the channels of political change by deciding who stays out of the 
democratic process.281  More recently, law of politics scholars such as 
Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have fleshed this argument out, 
suggesting that the Court invalidated malapportioned districts in response to 
an entrenchment problem reflected in the unwillingness of certain 
legislators to relinquish power.282  In particular, they argue that the standard 
 
 275. Id. 
 276. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword:  The Elysian Fields of the 
Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2004). 
 277. ELY, supra note 28, at 103. 
 278. Sullivan & Karlan, supra note 276, at 697. 
 279. ELY, supra note 28, at 103. 
 280. Ortiz, supra note 20, at 727. 
 281. See ELY, supra note 28, at 117.  Ely is also concerned with restrictions on freedom 
of expression and delegation of lawmaking to indirectly accountable agencies. See id. at 
105–16, 131–34. 
 282. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 595 (2002) (describing the concern animating the reapportionment cases as the ends-
oriented manipulation of districts); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword:  The Constitutionalization 
of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 44 (2004) (“The justification for judicial 
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entrenchment.”); see also Klarman, supra note 153, at 513 (describing malapportionment as 
an entrenchment problem).  These scholars have suggested that the Court’s focus should be 
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competitive partisan environment.” Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, Politics as 
Markets:  Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998). 
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of one-person, one-vote, which required state legislatures to reapportion on 
a periodic basis, was intended to redress the problem of entrenchment.283 
However, a closer look at the reapportionment cases, particularly those 
establishing one-person, one-vote as the constitutional standard, and the 
rationales underlying them, reveals that the Court is not merely engaging in 
anti-entrenchment judicial review.  It is surely the case that concerns about 
entrenchment partially motivated political outsiders to challenge 
malapportioned districts.  The impetus for the challenge to the 
malapportionment in Tennessee in Baker was the failure of rural state 
legislators to agree to reapportion every ten years as required by the state 
Constitution.  And for one Justice at least, the decision to join the majority 
holding in Baker that malapportionment presented a justiciable controversy 
was a response to the lack of alternative political channels to force state 
legislators to reapportion.284  But the cases that followed Baker indicate that 
the Court was doing something more than simply responding to the process 
defect of legislative entrenchment.  And this suggests that we need to look 
elsewhere for a process-theoretic justification for judicial review in these 
cases. 
First, the anti-entrenchment explanation cannot account for the judicial 
invalidation of malapportioned districts that arose from requirements 
embedded in state constitutions.  Many states sought to replicate the federal 
model of representation in the Senate and House of Representatives.  They 
therefore required in their constitutions that one house of the state 
legislature be apportioned on the basis of geography—usually on the basis 
of political subdivisions like counties—and the other house on the basis of 
population.285  Many of these constitutional systems of apportionment pre-
dated the mass migrations to the cities that began in the late nineteenth 
century.286  Rural state legislators, therefore, cannot be seen as actively 
entrenching their own power in these contexts any more than senators in the 
context of the U.S. Senate.  Rather, legislators represented political 
subdivisions of varying sizes in accordance with a state constitutional 
mandate.  Nonetheless, despite the absence of an entrenchment problem, the 
Court struck down these mini-federal plans in two of the companion cases 
to Reynolds.287  It explained that these plans were inconsistent with the 
 
 283. See Foster, supra note 20, at 1118–19 (arguing that the vote dilution cases go “to the 
proper functioning of the democratic process” and are thus “critical to the functioning of an 
open and effective democratic process” (quoting ELY, supra note 28, at 105)). 
 284. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 145, at 156–58 (describing how Justice 
Clark switched sides from dissenting to concurring with the majority opinion in Baker after 
deciding that people of the state lacked any alternative political channels to correct the 
malapportionment). 
 285. See id. at 46–47 (describing the extent of constitutionally prescribed county 
representation in state legislatures). 
 286. See id. 
 287. See Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 674–75 (1964) 
(invalidating the apportionment formula of the Maryland state constitution because it did not 
apportion on the basis of population); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 653–54 
(1964) (invalidating the apportionment formula of the New York State Constitution because 
it did not apportion on the basis of population). 
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federal constitutional mandate that population be the basis of apportionment 
for the entire state legislature.288 
Second, the Court’s decision in a third companion case to Reynolds, 
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado,289 is notable because 
it is also inconsistent with the idea that the Court was exclusively, or even 
predominantly, concerned with the problem of entrenchment.  After the 
decision in Baker, the people of the State of Colorado agreed by popular 
initiative to maintain malapportioned districts in one house of their state 
legislature rather than adopt one that would provide approximately equally 
apportioned districts in both houses.290  There was majority support for the 
districting arrangement in every county of the state, including the urban 
ones that lost political power due to the malapportionment.291  While rural 
legislators likely supported the initiative, they were clearly not responsible 
for entrenching their own power in the state legislature; rather the 
responsibility lay with the people as a whole.  Nonetheless, the Court 
invalidated the popularly ratified malapportioned scheme explaining that, 
irrespective of its means of adoption, it was inconsistent with the 
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.292  If the role of the Court in 
these cases was only to clear the channels of political change, the Colorado 
system of apportionment should have been upheld given the availability and 
utilization of the popular initiative, an alternative political channel to 
prevent entrenchment.  The fact that the Court did not choose this path is 
evidence that it was concerned about something more than entrenchment. 
Finally, the judicial solution to the problem of malapportionment in these 
cases does little to resolve the problem of legislative entrenchment.  The 
judicial mandate of one-person, one-vote under the Equal Protection Clause 
requires that state legislatures reapportion after the census every ten years to 
provide for equally apportioned districts.  If the concern with entrenchment 
is that state legislators will manipulate apportionments to maintain their 
power, then it is precisely the wrong answer to give them freer rein to 
configure their districts in a way that will best allow them to retain power 
and prevent outsiders from sharing in that power.293  The constitutional 
 
 288. See Tawes, 377 U.S. at 674–75; WMCA, 377 U.S. at 653–54. 
 289. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
 290. Id. at 717 (the residents of the State of Colorado adopted the malapportioned scheme 
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 291. See id. at 730. 
 292. The Court recognized that this case was distinct from other cases it had decided 
because “the initiative device provide[d] a practicable political remedy to obtain relief 
against alleged legislative malapportionment in Colorado.” Id. at 732.  Nonetheless, the 
Court held that the apportionment of Senate seats under the initiative “clearly involve[d] 
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permissible.” Id. at 734–35. 
 293. See Engstrom, supra note 145, at 278 (“Not only had the Court failed to develop 
effective checks on the [legislative] practice of gerrymandering, but in pursuing the goal of 
population equality to a point of satiety it had actually facilitated that practice.”). 
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bounds of equally apportioned districts is not much of a limit at all, given 
the many ways that districts can be configured within this constraint.  
Moreover, the requirement that legislators reapportion every ten years gives 
legislators constitutional cover for the continual revision of districts to 
better secure entrenchment in response to population shifts.  These 
opportunities for entrenchment can be contrasted with the prior arrangement 
in many states in which political subdivisions were represented in at least 
one house and legislators could not control who their constituents were.  
Such an arrangement did skew representation in favor of rural districts, but 
at the same time, it limited the opportunity of incumbent legislators to 
manipulate district lines as a means to entrench their own power. 
If the Court in the reapportionment cases was principally concerned with 
entrenchment, it could have invalidated only those malapportionments that 
clearly demonstrated legislative efforts to entrench incumbents’ power.  
This could have been accomplished through the very process-based 
standard that Justice Clark advanced in his concurrences in Baker and 
Reynolds, when he suggested that apportionment schemes should be struck 
down when they were so “topsy-turvical” that they lacked any rational 
design.294  This standard, which would have protected systems of 
apportionment by subdivision, would have invalidated obvious examples of 
entrenchment when legislators enact schemes that protect some political 
subdivisions and not others, or give unequal representation to political 
subdivisions for no rational reason. 
In addition, if the Court were seeking to redress entrenchment problems, 
it could have limited itself to striking down those malapportionments 
resulting from the legislature’s failure to follow a state constitutional 
mandate, which would be evidence of active entrenchment.295  
Alternatively, it could have invalidated legislative codifications of 
malapportionment when there were no feasible alternative political avenues 
for a majority of the people to overturn these legislative judgments.  The 
unwillingness of the Court to limit its constitutional solution to correcting 
the problem of entrenchment is evidence that the reapportionment cases 
were about something more than fixing this particular process defect. 
2.  Antidiscrimination Review 
The second role of representation-reinforcing judicial review that process 
theory advances is the facilitation of the representation of minorities.  The 
courts do this by guarding against government decision making that is 
motivated by hostility or prejudice toward a particular group.  According to 
process theory, it is appropriate to target these defects in the process of 
government decision making, rather than the outcomes resulting from the 
 
 294. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 588 (1964) (Clark, J. concurring); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring). 
 295. This was the situation in Tennessee prior to Baker. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, 
supra note 145, at 25 (“Tennessee’s state constitution of 1891 required equal representation 
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decision, because the requirement that laws treat everyone equally is 
unattainable, and perhaps even unpalatable.296  When evaluating the 
allocation of gratuitous benefits—benefits that are not constitutional 
entitlements—the courts should therefore focus on correcting process 
malfunctions indicated by government decisions motivated by dislike of a 
particular group.297 
This emphasis on correcting defects in government decision-making 
processes is at the heart of the antidiscrimination principle, and it animates 
the intent standard reaffirmed in the Davis trilogy.  Courts that apply this 
antidiscrimination principle to facially neutral laws scrutinize process 
defects at two stages.  First, they assess whether there is direct or 
circumstantial evidence that the legislators were motivated by racial 
considerations in adopting a law that disproportionately disadvantages a 
racial minority.298  This is the basis for the intent standard.  Second, 
assuming such evidence demonstrates that the decision was race-based, 
courts then evaluate whether a compelling government interest supports the 
action, and if so, whether the action is narrowly tailored to achieve the 
compelling interest.  This is the strict scrutiny standard that process 
theorists have described as the handmaiden of motive review.299 
Scholars that examine the vote dilution cases through a process-theoretic 
lens try to fit them into this category of representation-reinforcing judicial 
review.300  But there are two problems with such analyses:  First, the 
allocation of representation cannot accurately be described as a gratuitous 
benefit that fits within this category of representation-reinforcing judicial 
review.  Second, and more importantly, categorizing the vote dilution cases 
as instances of antidiscrimination review is based on a misunderstanding of 
what challengers are required to prove in those cases.  As I argued in Part I, 
the Court, in cases like Whitcomb, White, Bolden, and Rogers, did not 
scrutinize the challenged laws for indications that racial bias motivated their 
adoption; nor did the Court subject the electoral schemes ultimately 
invalidated in White and Rogers to strict scrutiny, which would have 
required checking for a compelling interest or narrow tailoring at the back 
end.  Instead, the Court has invalidated electoral schemes once they are 
shown to operate in a context that results in groups being deprived of the 
effective opportunity to influence the political process. 
Rather than correcting a process defect, the Court in its enforcement of 
the representative equality principle is enforcing a substantive model of 
democratic representation.  The choice, for example, in the one-person, one-
 
 296. See ELY, supra note 28, at 135–36. 
 297. See id. at 136. 
 298. For further analysis, see the discussion of the famous trilogy of cases beginning with 
Davis in Part I.A; see also ELY, supra note 28, at 136–45 (describing the Court’s use of 
motive analysis). 
 299. See infra Part I.A; see also ELY, supra note 28, at 145–46 (explaining how the strict 
scrutiny analysis, applied to suspect classification, “function[s] as a handmaiden of 
motivation analysis”). 
 300. See Sullivan & Karlan, supra note 276, at 709 (describing vote dilution claims as 
being at “the intersection of the antientrenchment and the antidiscrimination rationales”). 
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vote cases that the proper aggregation of votes in our representative 
government is by population is a clear value judgment.301  It is a value 
judgment that rejects other bases of aggregation, such as by geography, 
which was utilized in the organization of the U.S. Senate and served as a 
model for many states prior to the Court striking them down.302  Similarly, 
the adoption of majority rule and effective representation for minorities was 
a value judgment that subordinated a prior form of representative 
government that had provided a minority veto to protect against majority 
tyranny.  This is essentially a judgment that the political marketplace is not 
comprised of a monolithic majority that necessitates special protection for 
minorities, but rather is comprised of many minorities whose opportunities 
for coalition building should be facilitated. 
Judicial enforcement of the representative equality principle therefore 
enforces important substantive value judgments and does not fit neatly 
within either form of representation-reinforcing judicial review.  I argue in 
the next subsection that what the Court is doing in these cases is engaging 
in a form of representation-structuring judicial review.  The value 
judgments required for this form of review can be reconciled with process 
theory, and ultimately with democracy itself, because they set up the critical 
structural preconditions for representation-reinforcing judicial review—a 
government that is in fact representative of all interests. 
B.  Representation-Structuring Judicial Review 
Process theorists tend to overlook the pivotal role that courts have 
played, and should continue to play, in securing the initial preconditions for 
representation-reinforcing judicial review.303  In this role that I describe as 
representation-structuring judicial review, the Court has enforced the 
Constitution to structure the political marketplace so that majorities control 
and marginalized minority interest groups are included and accounted 
for.304  Ely did dedicate an oft-overlooked chapter in his book Democracy 
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Ackerman, supra note 31, at 738. 
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and Distrust to describing the court’s role in securing the structural 
preconditions for representative government, but even he placed much more 
emphasis on representation-reinforcing judicial review.305  Here I will focus 
on this critical third function for judicial review and argue that it provides a 
normative justification for the Court’s vote dilution doctrine. 
The structural preconditions that Ely’s process theory describes for 
representative government require a balancing of popular control with 
egalitarianism.  Ely described several forms of representation-structuring 
judicial review to secure the structural preconditions for representative 
government.  These include judicial protection of the ballot and periodic 
elections, the divisions of power between the three branches of the federal 
government and between the federal government and the states, and the 
virtual representation of politically disempowered individuals and groups 
through the requirement of generally applicable laws.306  These forms of 
judicial review fall outside of the Carolene Products footnote four 
framework since they are not solely concerned with process.  Instead, these 
forms of judicial review necessarily involve the Court advancing 
substantive value choices about the proper form of representative 
government—one that balances majority rule with the equal treatment of 
minorities in the political marketplace. 
However, while Ely recognized the need to safeguard the structural pre-
conditions for effective democratic representation, the judicial tools that he 
offered for facilitating an inclusive and representative political marketplace 
are underinclusive, both normatively and descriptively.  Ely’s tendency was 
to leave many of the problems of representative government to correction at 
the back end through representation-reinforcing judicial review of already-
enacted laws.  But back-end review is limited.  In particular, it cannot 
ensure opportunities for politically marginalized minorities to have their 
interests accounted for and considered in the political marketplace.  Such 
opportunities can, however, be protected through the representative equality 
principle of effective representation.  In the rest of this part, I describe the 
three main roles that Ely offered for the Court in structuring the 
representative process and show why they are not adequate for protecting 
politically marginalized minorities in the political marketplace.  I then show 
how the Court’s enforcement of the representative equality principle fills 
some of the gap in securing the equal treatment of minorities in the political 
marketplace. 
Ely set forth a clear role for the courts in securing a representative 
government.307  In a representative government, the vote is fundamental.  
Judicial safeguarding of the vote therefore represents more than simply the 
prevention of self-entrenchment or the clearing of the channels of political 
change.  Without the ballot, there is no representative government.  The 
ballot and frequent elections provide the principal structural mechanism for 
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ensuring that the ruled control the rulers.  If the rulers act contrary to the 
interests of the ruled, the ruled can simply vote them out of office and 
replace them with others that would better represent their interests.308  But 
the vote only assures one aspect of representative government:  majority 
control.  While voting and elections serve to ensure that the rulers are 
accountable and responsive to the ruled, they do not necessarily guarantee 
that the rulers are accountable and responsive to all segments of the ruled.  
The rulers only really have to be responsive and accountable to a majority 
of the ruled in order to secure reelection.  Voting as a method of popular 
control therefore provides little guarantee that the interests of minorities 
will be accounted for and considered in the decision-making process.  Ely 
recognized this, explaining that since any majority can outvote the minority 
in an election, there is nothing to guarantee that the minority’s votes will be 
effective in securing representation in the political process.309 
Ely therefore suggested a second means built into the Constitution itself 
that helps reconcile popular control and the protection of minorities.  This is 
the constitutional division of powers vertically between the states and the 
federal government and horizontally between the three branches of the 
federal government.310  The Framers of the Constitution designed this 
pluralism of governing structures to ensure that no majority faction would 
be able to exert tyrannical control over all of the instruments of power.311  
However, while these constitutionally embedded mechanisms may be 
necessary, they are ultimately insufficient for protecting politically 
marginalized minorities in a system premised on majority rule.  Even 
assuming that different majority coalitions control different parts of 
government, there is little to ensure the protection of minorities that are not 
part of the majority coalition at any level of the government.  Instead, there 
is the distinct possibility that these minorities will be marginalized from the 
political marketplace at all levels of government in that their interests will 
not be considered or accounted for in government decision-making 
processes.  This has been the case for African Americans for much of 
American history. 
Therefore, in addition to the vote and the division of power, Ely also 
recognized the need in any theory of representation “to ensure . . . that the 
representative would not sever his interest from those of a majority of his 
constituency but also that he would not sever a majority coalition’s interests 
from those of various minorities.”312  Toward this end, Ely pointed to a 
third tool that contributes to the reconciliation of popular rule and 
 
 308. Id. at 78. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 80.  Another strategy that the Founders employed to protect minorities was the 
Bill of Rights.  Ely recognized, however, that the problem with this strategy was that “[n]o 
finite lists of entitlements can possibly cover all the ways majorities can tyrannize 
minorities.” Id. at 81. 
 311. Id. at 80; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 206, at 268 (James Madison) 
(discussing the division of powers as a means for “ambition . . . to counteract ambition”). 
 312. See ELY, supra note 28, at 82. 
2012] THE REPRESENTATIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE 233 
egalitarianism:  virtual representation.313  According to the theory of virtual 
representation, elected actors represent—through their support and 
enactment of generally applicable laws—individuals that can vote as well as 
those that cannot, because the interests of both parties are assumed to be 
very nearly related, and most inseparably connected.314  The courts police 
the process of virtual representation by invalidating any laws that are not 
generally applicable, but that are instead biased in favor of one group over 
another.315  This is perhaps the most promising avenue that Ely suggested 
for ensuring attention to the interests of the politically marginalized.  I 
therefore explore it in some detail below. 
McCulloch v. Maryland316 serves as the leading example of judicial 
enforcement of the idea of virtual representation.317  In that case, the Bank 
of the United States challenged the constitutionality of a state tax on the 
operation of banks not chartered by the state.318  The Court invalidated the 
tax, but conspicuously explained that the rationale did not extend to other 
generally applicable real estate taxes to which the national bank was 
subjected.319  According to process theory, this discrepancy can be 
explained from the perspective of virtual representation.  Through the 
targeted tax on banks not chartered by the state, the state legislature had 
severed the interests of the politically empowered state banks from the 
politically powerless national bank through biased legislation that advanced 
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the interest of the state bank at the expense of the national bank.  The 
national bank that had already lacked actual representation in the state 
legislature was now being denied virtual legislation as a result of the 
enactment of the biased law.320 
The biased tax law can be contrasted with a generally applicable real 
estate tax that would impact the politically empowered state banks and the 
politically powerless national bank equally.  Such a generally applicable tax 
offers a structural guarantee that the legislative decision-making process 
would account for the national bank’s interests because of the need to be 
accountable to the politically empowered state banks in the levying of the 
tax.321  Thus, by policing the representative process for defects in virtual 
representation, the courts could protect the politically powerless national 
bank by ensuring that its interests were tied to the politically empowered 
state bank. 
Virtual representation is a promising tool for protecting the politically 
marginalized.  However, judicial invalidation of targeted laws that indicate 
a breakdown of the system of virtual representation can still leave the 
interests of the politically marginalized unaccounted for in the political 
process.  In particular, a central assumption underlying virtual 
representation is that there is a degree of homogeneity of interests between 
the politically empowered and disempowered.322  For example, returning to 
McCulloch, the interests of the politically powerless Bank of the United 
States can be considered sufficiently protected when the state legislature 
passes generally applicable laws if it is similarly situated to the politically 
empowered state chartered banks.  However, one can imagine a context in 
which the politically empowered state bank is differently situated from the 
politically powerless national bank such that a generally applicable law 
would affect the two entities in fundamentally different ways.  
Hypothetically, the state legislature’s adoption of a generally applicable real 
estate tax on banks could ultimately bankrupt a financially weak and 
politically powerless Bank of the United States, while allowing the more 
financially sound and politically empowered state chartered banks to stay in 
business.  The state legislature might have enacted the law out of simple 
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hostility to the national bank, but it may also be the case that it enacts laws 
out of ignorance of, or indifference toward, the financial conditions and 
circumstances of the national bank. 
Even more distressing, one can imagine a predominantly white, southern 
state legislature selected in elections in which their constituents vote in a 
racially polarized manner such that the white constituents vote for 
candidates responsive to their interests and never vote for candidates 
responsive to the interests of the ethnic minority community.  Members of 
the state legislature selected in these contexts are likely to lack knowledge 
of the interests of the minority community since they never campaigned in 
their neighborhoods or asked for their votes in exchange for policies 
responsive to their interests.  These divisions may leave the two 
communities disconnected from each other such that the majority has little 
knowledge of, or interest in, the conditions and circumstances that the 
minority community faces. 
When deciding upon and enacting generally applicable laws on matters 
like public school funding, housing, and employment, legislators 
representing these districts are less likely to account for and consider the 
interests of the minority community.  At the same time, societal divisions in 
wealth, education, and employment as well as segregation in housing will 
leave the majority and minority differently situated such that generally 
applicable laws impact the two in fundamentally different ways.  In these 
circumstances, virtual representation alone will not ensure adequate 
consideration of minority interests. 
A potential objection to equating the national bank in McCulloch with 
politically marginalized minorities in the United States today is that, for the 
most part, members of the latter groups can actually vote.323  Presumably, 
the need for virtual representation diminishes when the non-electors are 
enfranchised because then they can secure actual representation by 
threatening to vote elected officials out of office if they fail to serve their 
interests. 
To the extent that the political minority is an ordinary political minority 
that has the opportunity to participate in the pluralist marketplace, this 
threat is credible.  Such minorities have the opportunity to form coalitions 
with disaffected members of the majority coalition to secure actual 
representation in the next election.  Recognizing this potential, elected 
officials have incentives to account for the interests of the ordinary minority 
when making generally applicable public policy. 
However, the distinction between being able to vote and not being able to 
vote for purposes of securing actual representation dissolves when the 
minority is politically marginalized.  For these minorities, the threat to vote 
individuals out of office is not credible because societal animus or social 
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isolation prevents them from forming the necessary coalitions to influence 
elections unless they happen to comprise a majority in a particular 
jurisdiction.324  These politically marginalized minorities face a political 
context in which voting is polarized and candidates for office can appeal 
exclusively to the majority community to win elections.325  These 
candidates for office experience no electoral costs for failing to learn about 
the needs and interests of the minority community or even for failing to 
campaign for votes from these groups.  When animus toward the minority 
group is particularly strong, the majority may even punish candidates that 
attempt to develop a platform that recognizes the interests of the minority.  
This can carry over to the policymaking domain, where elected officials 
negotiate and enact generally applicable laws that do not account for the 
needs and interests of the politically marginalized minority community.326  
Thus, with respect to the politically marginalized minority, the vote is 
rendered essentially meaningless. 
But even assuming that the politically marginalized are not virtually 
represented in the political process, an argument can be made that 
representation-reinforcing judicial review is sufficient to ensure that they 
are being treated with equal concern and respect.  Specifically, process 
theory suggests that the courts should invalidate laws passed out of simple 
hostility to a minority group.327  As discussed above, this is the explanation 
for judicial scrutiny of the motivation of decision makers under the Equal 
Protection Clause.328  The problem with this fallback option is that scrutiny 
of laws motivated by discrimination cannot adequately compensate for a 
political process that is not truly representative.  In particular, it cannot 
correct for the infirmity in the representative process that results in laws 
passed out of ignorance and without consideration of the interests of the 
politically marginalized minorities who are neither virtually nor actually 
represented in the political process.  Government decision makers’ 
ignorance of the interests of the minority can be just as harmful to that 
group as hostility toward that minority. 
Stronger representation-structuring tools are therefore necessary to 
reconcile the tension between popular control and egalitarianism.  Judicial 
enforcement of the representative equality principle should be seen as one 
such tool. Through this tool, the Court has simultaneously enforced both 
majority rule and effective minority representation.329  It has enforced the 
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requirement that popular control be maintained through districts that are 
equally apportioned.330  At the same time, the Court has secured the 
accommodation of minority interests within the mandate of majority rule by 
invalidating districting arrangements that exclude the politically 
marginalized from the pluralist marketplace.331  In doing so, courts have 
forced jurisdictions to structure their districts in a way that provides 
opportunities for representation in the political process for politically 
marginalized minorities.  This has produced a greater likelihood that the 
interests of the marginalized will be accounted for in government decision 
making. 
This judicial provision of opportunities for representation of all interests 
does not mean that every interest is guaranteed a group representative in 
office.  The problem that representation-structuring judicial review 
responds to is that of the politically marginalized minorities’ lack of access 
to the political process as a result of either societal animus toward them or 
simpe ignorance about their existence or needs.  Those factors lead 
candidates and elected officials to not be particularly responsive to minority 
interests when running for office or when making policy once in office.332  
Enforcement of the representative equality principle guarantees that some 
of the political candidates for any particular governing body will have to 
account for and perhaps appeal to the interests of the politically 
marginalized minority group.  And once in office, at least some elected 
officials in that political body will have to bring into consideration the 
interests of the politically marginalized in the policymaking process to have 
any hopes of securing reelection.  This does not mean that the political body 
must pass laws favorable to the politically marginalized, but it should 
produce public policies that, at a minimum, compare favorably to what was 
enacted prior to the recognition of the particular group’s interests. 
The role of the courts in ensuring a government representative of all 
interests is, therefore, to remove electoral barriers that result in minority 
exclusion and force states to erect electoral structures that will remedy this 
deprivation.  Performing these functions is perfectly consistent with the 
judicial role in structuring representative government that is outlined in 
process theory, because it reconciles egalitarianism with popular control.  
This is what the courts have been doing in the vote dilution cases. 
Reexamining Rogers through this expanded process-theoretic lens, it 
becomes clear that the factors that the Court considered relevant in 
assessing the constitutionality of the at-large district are ones that go to the 
questions of the political marginalization of the minority group and the 
level of access it has to the political process.  Racially polarized voting, and 
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particularly the unwillingness of whites to vote for minority-preferred 
candidates, evidenced the political marginalization of the African American 
community in Burke County, Georgia.333  Moreover, the political party 
system of competition for votes had broken down.  This competitive system 
could ordinarily be relied upon to create opportunities for access to the 
political process for minority communities, since one party or the other 
would likely account for their interests.334  In Burke County, however, one 
party dominated.335  Therefore, it could exclude politically marginalized 
groups from involvement in the candidate slating process without any 
electoral repercussions.  And candidates for this party did not have to 
compete for the votes of groups excluded from the political coalition 
because of societal animus or ignorance.  The result was a Burke County 
Board of Commissioners comprised of elected officials that were generally 
unresponsive to the needs and interests of the politically marginalized black 
community.  In the policymaking process, road paving in black 
neighborhoods likely never made it onto the agenda, and complaints about 
school and grand jury segregation were likely ignored.336  An 
unrepresentative process of selection therefore contributed to 
unrepresentative policymaking. 
While the Court could not correct the underlying societal animus, it could 
correct the structural defect that led to the unrepresentative process.  And it 
did so, of course, by invalidating the at-large structure.337  This forced 
Burke County to replace the at-large structure with single-member electoral 
districts, some of which would provide the politically marginalized group 
with an opportunity to influence electoral outcomes.338  Most importantly, 
these districts would serve the process-theoretic value of ensuring that 
minority interests are treated with equal concern and respect in the political 
marketplace.  This value is at the heart of the constitutional representative 
equality principle and central to the reconciliation of popular control and 
egalitarianism. 
CONCLUSION 
The intent standard under the Equal Protection Clause is not universally 
applicable to all claims brought under the clause.  While the Court, in much 
of its equal protection jurisprudence, has limited its review to laws 
motivated by discrimination, in an important set of cases it has not.  In this 
latter set of cases, the Court has invalidated laws that are not motivated by 
bias but operate in a manner that is inconsistent with two judicially derived 
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principles of representative equality:  majority rule and opportunities for 
effective representation of minority groups.  Electoral structures that 
provide a single powerful minority control over the political process in the 
form of a veto, or that deprive a politically marginalized minority group of 
the opportunity to influence government decision making are not 
appropriately considered representative. 
This alternative framework for evaluating challenges to electoral 
structures has important implications for the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act.  The Act, rather than simply being seen as a vehicle that is 
enforcing a constitutional antidiscrimination requirement, should also be 
seen as one enforcing the constitutional principle of representative equality.  
When assessing the constitutionality of the Act from this perspective, it 
therefore should matter much less that the Act is focused on the results of 
electoral schemes and not on their process of adoption.  It also should 
matter much less that the Act sometimes requires that states engage in race-
conscious decision making to secure the effective representation of minority 
groups.  Reliance on race in the drawing of district lines may be in tension 
with the antidiscrimination principle, but it is often necessary to secure the 
critical preconditions for representative government to operate in the first 
place.  And in this clash of constitutional principles, the establishment of 
the preconditions for representative government should ordinarily supersede 
the antidiscrimination mandate. 
